## AT Marajuana CP

Perm do both, it’s not manually exclusive so any risk that the counter plan is insufficient is a reason the AFF is still good.

CP doesn’t solve Cartels are diversified. Grillo 15**[[1]](#footnote--1)**

Despite the drop in homicides, Mexico’s **violence is still at painful levels**. In September, cartel thugs working with corrupt police attacked a group of students, killing three and abducting 43. The atrocity caused hundreds of thousands to take to the streets to protest corruption and bloodshed. On Monday, cartel gunmen ambushed police in Jalisco state, killing 15 in one of the worst attacks on security forces in recent years. A key problem is that **cartels have diversified to** a portfolio of other **crimes, from sex trafficking to stealing** crude **oil** from Mexican pipelines. They also make billions smuggling hard drugs. **Seizures of** both **heroin and crystal meth** on the U.S.-Mexico border **have gone up as** those of **marijuana have sunk**, according to U.S. Homeland Security, with agents nabbing a record 34,840 pounds of meth in 2014. In total, **Americans spend about $100 billion on illegal drugs every year**, according to a White House report. The estimate puts **marijuana** at about 40% of this, so the legal **industry still only accounts for a fraction of the total**. One restriction to growth is that U.S. federal law still prohibits cannabis, making banking difficult and scaring investors.

Turn, the counterplan makes it worse legalizing weed ignores that drug cartels are HIGHLY adaptable and resilient and will move into HIGHER-PROFILE criminal activities. **Keeffe 14**[[2]](#footnote-0)

But the question of who will inherit the Sinaloa cartel may be somewhat beside the point, because, well before Guzmán’s capture, the landscape of crime in **Mexico had begun to shift**. Whereas Sinaloa is atraditional drug **cartel**, focussing chiefly on the manufacture and export of narcotics, newer groups, such as the Zetas and the Knights Templar, **have diversified their** money-making **activities to include extortion, human trafficking, and kidnapping** for ransom. **With** cocaine consumption declining in the U.S., and **marijuana on a path toward** widespread **legalization**, **a Darwinian logic is driving the cartels’ expansion into more parasitic varieties of crime**. Organizations that once concentrated exclusively on drugs now extract rents from Mexico’soil industry and export stolen iron ore to China; the price of limes in U.S. grocery stores has doubled in the past few years because the cartels are taxing Mexico’s citrus farmers. “We don’t have a drug problem—we have a crime problem,” more than one Mexican official told me, and, as the criminal syndicates continue to evolve, this dynamic could end up rendering organizations like Guzmán’s obsolete. The prohibition of narcotics may have created a monster, but, as Alejandro Hope pointed out, even **if you decriminalized all drugs tomorrow the monster would find a way to survive. “You can’t legalize kidnapping,”** he said.

You should view counterplans through a lens of necessity to check back against infinite alternatives, which means vote AFF because the plan is sufficient to solve.

## AT Soft Gun Control CPs

Perm ban handguns and do the counterplan for everything else means the counterplan is not mutually exclusive. Also solves the advantages best because it is the most total gun control, which is net better for sending a signal to Latin America and limiting Guns across the border.

Case solves better, the more guns people have access to the more will move across the border, and a total ban is a much stronger signal to Latin America so the case solves best.

You should view counterplans through a lens of necessity to check back against infinite alternatives, which means vote AFF because the plan is sufficient to solve.

## AT States CP

Perm do the counterplan, there’s nothing in the AFF that forces me to defending the federal government because they states are still within the United States.

Federalism leads to ineffective responses to disease outbreaks, terrorist attacks, and natural disaster **Griffin, 07[[3]](#footnote-1)**

**And so it is still the case that when natural disasters strike, the divided power of the federal structure presents a coordination problem. The kind of coordination that had to occur to avoid the Katrina disaster requires long-term planning before the event**. The **American constitutional system makes taking intergovernmental action difficult and complex**. The process of coordinating governments can take years. In many ways, the government was just at the beginning of that process at the time of Katrina, [n48](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.623515.1689064805&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1215280977638&returnToKey=20_T4099813154&parent=docview" \l "n48#n48) although we are now four years distant from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 that set the latest round of disaster coordination in motion. Suppose, however, that we don't have the luxury of taking the time to satisfy every official with a veto. This is the key point of tension between what contemporary governance demands and what the Constitution permits. The kind of limited change that occurred in 1927 can take us only so far. What Hurricane Katrina showed was that even after decades of experience with natural disasters, the federal and state governments were still uncoordinated and unprepared. The reasons they were unprepared go to the heart of the constitutional order. **Unless we learn some lessons, Katrina will happen again. It may be a massive earthquake, an influenza pandemic, a terrorist attack, or even another hurricane, but the same ill-coordinated response will indeed happen again unless some attention is paid to the constitutional and institutional lessons of Katrina. We need to "stop** **federalism" before it kills again. That is, we need to stop our customary thinking about what** **federalism requires in order to prevent another horrific loss of life and property.**

Extinction **Yu 9**[[4]](#footnote-2)

A **pandemic will kill off all humans**. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, **new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of** a pandemic-facilitated human **extinction**. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of **new strains could prove far more consequential**. The simultaneous occurrence of **antigenic drift** (point mutations that lead to new strains) **and antigenic shift** (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus **could produce a new version** of influenza for **which scientists may not immediately find a cure**. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

No impact. Federalism is meaningless. **Greve 12**[[5]](#footnote-3)

In an instructive law review article, the late Bobby Lipkin collected the contemporary Supreme Court’s references to **federalism’s “balance”** and showed that the notion **is empty. It has no constitutional reference** point, **and its** **deployment** as an actual constitutional norm—as opposed to high-toned burble to tart up a result reached on other grounds—**has absurd implications**. **Suppose**, for example, that some otherwise constitutional **federal law shifts the** “constitutionally mandated**” balance to the states’ detriment: could we make it up to the states by giving them a power to**, say, **tax** imports from China? Would that make us feel better about our federalism (because “balance” has been restored)? **I didn’t think so,** either.

## AT Crime DA

Best evidence proves gun rights increase crime. Aneja et al 14**[[6]](#footnote-4)**

Across the basic seven Index I crime categories, **the strongest evidence of a statistically significant effect would be for aggravated assault**, with 11 of 28 estimates suggesting that RTC laws increase this crime at the .10 confidence level. An omitted variable bias test on our preferred Table 8a results suggests that **our estimated 8 percent increase in aggravated assaults from RTC laws may understate the true harmful impact** of RTC laws on aggravated assault, which may explain why this finding is only significant at the .10 level in many of our models. Our analysis of the year-by-year impact of RTC laws also suggests that RTC laws increase aggravated assaults. Our analysis of admittedly imperfect gun aggravated assaults provides suggestive evidence that **RTC laws** may be associated with large increases in this crime, perhaps **increas**ing such **gun assaults by almost 33 percent**. In addition to aggravated assault, **the most plausible state models conducted over the entire 1979-2010 period provide evidence that RTC laws increase rape and robbery** (but usually only at the .10 level). In contrast, for the period from 1999-2010 (which seeks to remove the confounding influence of the crack cocaine epidemic), the preferred state model (for those who accept the Wolfers proposition that one should not control for state trends) yields statistically significant evidence for only one crime -- suggesting that RTC laws increase the rate of murder at the .05 significance level. It will be worth exploring whether other methodological approaches and/or additional years of data will confirm the results of this panel-data analysis and clarify some of the highly sensitive results and anomalies (such as the occasional estimates that RTC laws lead to higher rates of property crime) that have plagued this inquiry for over a decade.

Soft Power is high -- the Freedom Act and legalization of gay marriage both vastly improved our soft power, and the world loves American ideas. Wike 13**[[7]](#footnote-5)**

**Surveys consistently show that** movies – and more broadly, **American popular culture** – are **a strong suit of U.S. soft power**. And, while studio executives spend considerably more time thinking about box office returns than public diplomacy, Tinseltown is actually pretty effective at nudging America’s international image in a positive direction. (Certainly, with anti-Americanism still strong in the Middle East and among some other nations, brand America needs all the help it can get).¶ American culture is especially attractive in Europe. The continent may have a long tradition of intellectuals deriding U.S. culture, but average Europeans embrace it. A 2012 Pew Research Center poll found solid majorities in all eight European Union nations surveyed saying they like American movies, music, and television, including 72 percent in France, home to the Cannes Film Festival, Jean-Luc Godard, and (until recently) Gérard Depardieu. As is the case with nearly all things American, U.S. pop culture is more popular among Europeans in the Obama era than it was during George W. Bush’s presidency, although even during the Bush years, when European anti-Americanism was surging, most still had a favorable opinion of American entertainment. And it’s not just Europe – about [as did] seven-in-ten of those surveyed in Japan, Brazil, and Mexico, for example, say they enjoy U.S. movies, music, and television.¶ In nearly all countries included in the survey, America’s **pop culture is especially attractive to young people**. For instance, a stunning 94 percent of Germans under age 30 like it, while just 47 percent of those 50 and older agreed. huge age gaps are also found in Russia, France, Britain and elsewhere.¶ In many nations, there is also an education gap. In China, where a growing middle class increasingly has yuan to spend on entertainment, 74 percent of people with a college degree enjoy American pop culture, compared with less than half of those with less education.¶ More from CNN: Make your Oscar picks¶ It’s true that Hollywood isn’t popular everywhere. In particular, it has limited appeal in some predominantly Muslim nations. Among 20 countries surveyed by Pew Research, the only four where majorities said they do not like American movies, music, and TV were Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. Views about culture are intertwined with other aspects of America’s image, and in countries like these, widespread opposition to U.S. policies and deep distrust of American motives continues to drive strong anti-American sentiments.¶ But the Muslim world is not monolithic, and attitudes toward American culture vary among Muslim populations. Six-in-ten Lebanese Sunni Muslims express a positive opinion, as do almost half of the country’s Shia Muslims – a fairly impressive number, given the fact that, when asked about their overall opinion of the U.S., only 7 percent of Lebanese Shia offer a positive response. Meanwhile, about eight-in-ten Lebanese Christians like American pop culture.¶

## AT Black Market DA

Turn – illegality generates **extremely high transaction costs** for both the buyer and the seller, actually reducing the black market – our evidence indicates that making handguns illegal and police enforcement are key – prefer our evidence, it is most specific to the aff and is the most intensive study **on the relationship between handgun bans and the underground market.** **Cook 6[[8]](#footnote-6)**

Our findings about the presence of substantial transaction costs and price markups in Chicago’s underground gun market stand in stark contrast to conventional wisdom in the sociology and criminology literatures. One candidate explanation is that **previous research has** sometimes **relied on answers to questions that were too vague to provide a measure of actual prices or transaction costs**.45 Of course one might be inclined to question the reliability of our data. **We rely** in large part **on** the unusually detailed **interviews and field observations** of Sudhir Venkatesh, which is to say that we rely on reports **from people who regularly engage in** **criminal** or anti-social **activities**. However SV’s interviews are generally quite consistent **with** the variety of other **data sources t**hat are available to us, including those that do not rely on self-reports by criminals.46 So **why does the gun market in the Chicago** South Side neighborhood studied by SV **have such high transaction costs?** Our **results suggest the answer is some combination of illegality and market thinness**. Handgun acquisition has been illegal in Chicago since 1982, and there are no licensed gun dealers in the city. **Illegality generates search costs** for buyers and sellers **in the market, which can generate market “thickness**” effects **on search costs, match quality and other characteristics of exchange** that are **relevant for transaction costs** in the gun market (Diamond, 1982, Gan and Zhang, 2005, 2006). The fact that there are fewer buyers, sellers and exchanges in the underground market for guns compared to drugs helps explain why transaction costs seem to be much greater in the market for guns. But this explanation itself raises the question of why the underground gun market is so thin. Even if there are relatively few buyers in this market, owing in part to the durability of guns, why don’t drug dealers and drug-selling gangs diversify into the gun trade, given that they already come into regular contact with most of the people who would be interested in obtaining a gun and cannot access licit sources? SV’s **interview data indicate that** police emphasis on guns seems may be an important contributing factor, since **gangs are reluctant to jeopardize the profits associated with the** more lucrative **drug trade**. While gangs are not actively involved in gun selling, they do provide an important mechanism for solving some of the information problems found in the gun market, in the sense that some youths report joining a gang for access to guns. The existence and reasons for these high transaction costs do not seem to be unique to the underground gun market in the high-crime South Side Chicago neighborhood studied by SV. While we do not have data for other jurisdictions that are as detailed as the results of SV’s intensive ethnographic fieldwork, administrative data sources and a 22-city survey of arrestees suggest that high transaction costs are common to other parts of Chicago and, indeed, are characteristic of underground gun markets more generally in American cities. These cross-city comparisons in transaction costs are limited by the fact that the arrestee samples are not necessarily intended to be representative of all criminals or even all arrestees in the participating cities; better data on criminal reports about underground gun markets across cities seems like an important priority for future research in this area.

Also the internal link is non-unique there are already illegal markets in the status quo for things like drugs, organs or basically anything else you could want.

It’s more likely that people would just switch to assault rifles then try to get a handgun illegally. AT Murder DA

Extinction is unique—if you think there’s a one in 75 million chance of our disad you should vote neg. **Posner 4[[9]](#footnote-7)**

**Even if our insouciant reaction to small probabilities of great losses is** accepted **as a**n authentic **basis for estimating the value of life** in most such situations, **the reaction may not generalize to ones in which the loss**, should it materialize, **would be** the near or total **extinction** of the human race. **If the** annual **probability of an** asteroid **collision that would kill 6 billion** people **is only 1 in 75 million,** the expected number of deaths worldwide is only 80 per **year**, which may not seem a large enough number to justify the expense of an effective defense against an asteroid collision. (This of course ignores smaller but still lethal collisions; but read on.) But **if** there is a minute chance that **the entire human race**, both current and future, **would be wiped out**, together with all or most of the world’s animal population, **we** (the ambiguous “we” of policy analysis, but there it may represent dominant public opinion) **may think that *something* should be done to** eliminate or reduce the **risk**, slight as it is, **beyond what a standard cost-benefit analysis would imply**; may be willing, if the risk and the possible responses are explained carefully, to incur some cost in higher taxes or otherwise to reduce the risk.

Extinction risks in particular are underestimated—their critique of predictions is backwards. **Yudkowsky 6[[10]](#footnote-8)**

I am sometimes asked: "**If <existential risk** X> **is real, why aren't more people doing something about it?"** There are many possible answers, a few of which I have touched on here. **People may be** overconfident and **over-optimistic**. They may focus on overly specific scenarios for the future, to the exclusion of all others. **They may not recall any past extinction events** in memory. **They may overestimate the** predictability of the **past**, and hence underestimate the surprise of the future. They may not realize the difficulty of preparing for emergencies without benefit of hindsight. They may prefer philanthropic gambles with higher payoff probabilities, neglecting the value of the stakes. They may conflate positive information about the benefits of a technology as negative information about its risks. **They may be contaminated by movies where the world ends up being saved**. They may purchase moral satisfaction more easily by giving to other charities. **Or the** extremely **unpleasant prospect of human extinction may spur them to seek arguments that humanity will not go extinct**, without an equally frantic search for reasons why we would. But if the question is, specifically, "Why aren't more people doing something about it?", one possible component is that **people are** asking that very question - darting their eyes around to see if anyone else is reacting to the emergency, meanwhile **trying to appear poised** and unflustered. **If you want to know why others aren't responding** to an emergency, **before you** respond yourself, **you may have just answered your own question**.

## AT Econ DA

No link police and the government still need to buy gun’s and they’d probably buy more if the industry is indeed to big to fail. Guns can also still be exported to other countries which is still enough of a market. Furthermore, there are still assault rifles, which companies can sell.

The gun industry is not key to the economy, all their evidence says is that it is big, however it does not substantiate that it is necessary. We are resilient and no one industry collapsing has brought the entire economy down. Also other countries with no gun industry and a functioning economy would disprove this link.

**No** chance of war from economic decline---**best** and **most recent** data. **Drezner 12**[[11]](#footnote-9)

**The** final **outcome addresses** a dog that hasn’t barked: **the effect of the** Great **Recession on** cross-border **conflict** and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple **analysts asserted** that the financial **crisis would lead states to** increase their **use** of **force** as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, **diversionary wars**, arms races, **or** a ratcheting up of **great power conflict**, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The **aggregate data suggests otherwise**, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The **average** level of **peacefulness in 2012 is** approximately **the same as** it was in 20**07**.”38 **Interstate violence** in particular **has declined since the** start of the **financial** **crisis** – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other **studies confirm** that **the** Great **Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict**; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has **not** to date **generated** the surge in **protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion** that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. **Given the severity, reach and depth of the** 20**08** financial **crisis, the proper comparison is with** Great **Depression**. And **by that standard, the outcome** variables **look** **impressive**. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and

## AT PTX \*Cards from separate file\*

Fiat means the AFF happens immediately, so there’s no debate in Congress and no loss of polcap.

The disad isn’t intrinsic a logical policymaker could do the AFF and still pass XXX policy.

[Won’t pass]

Winners win. **Green 10[[12]](#footnote-10)**

Moreover**, there is a** continuously evolving and **reciprocal relationship between presidential boldness and achievement.** In the same way that **nothing breeds success like success, nothing sets the president up for achieving his or her next goal better than succeeding dramatically on the last go around. This is absolutely a matter of perception, and you can** **see it best in the way that Congress and especially the Washington press corps fawn over bold and intimidating presidents like Reagan and** George W**. Bush. The political teams surrounding these presidents understood the psychology of power all too well. They knew that by** simultaneously **creating a steamroller effect** and feigning a clubby atmosphere for Congress and the press**, they could leave such hapless hangers-on with only one remaining way to pretend to preserve their dignities. By jumping on board the freight train, they could be given the illusion of being next to power, of being part of the winning team.** And so, with virtually the

[No impact]

## AT Heg Bad General

The US won’t give up the crown- we’ll go down fighting triggering all their impacts- hegemony critics agree. **Calleo ‘9**[[13]](#footnote-11)

It is tempting to believe that America’s recent misadventures will discredit and suppress our hegemonic longings and that, following the presidential election of 2008, a new administration will abandon them. But so long as our identity as a nation is intimately bound up with seeing ourselves as the world’s most powerful country, at the heart of a global system, **hegemony is likely to remain the recurring obsession of our** official **imagination**, the id´ee fixe of our foreign policy. **America’s hegemonic ambitions have**, after all, **suffered severe setbacks before**. Less than half a century has passed since **the “lesson of Vietnam**.” But that lesson **faded without forcing us to abandon** the old **fantasies** of omnipotence. The fantasies merely went into remission, until the fall of the Soviet Union provided an irresistible occasion for their return. Arguably, in its collapse, the Soviet Union proved to be a greater danger to America’s own equilibrium than in its heyday. Dysfunctional imaginations are scarcely a rarity – among individuals or among nations. “Reality” is never a clear picture that imposes itself from without. Imaginations need to collaborate. They synthesize old and new images, concepts, and ideas and fuse language with emotions – all according to the inner grammar of our minds. These **synthetic constructions become our reality**, our way of depicting the world in which we live. Inevitably, our imaginations present us with only a partial picture. As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a “pseudo-environment between ourselves and the world.”2 Every individual, therefore, has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favored collective view that differs from the favored view of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous.

## AT Heg Bad Disease

US leadership solves global disease spread. **One ‘10[[14]](#footnote-12)**

**Thanks to US leadership**, **the tools to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS**, TB and malaria are affordable, **effective, and saving millions of live**s each year. Nearly four million Africans—up from 50,000 in 2002—are now receiving antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS. Malaria programs have reached 25 million people with prevention and treatment measures. The Global Fund has also treated more than 7 million people for tuberculosis since 2002. But there’s still much more we must do. In 2008, HIV/AIDS killed 2 million people, 1.4 million in Africa alone. Malaria kills roughly 900,000 people every year—mostly children and pregnant women in sub-Saharan Africa—with 6.7 million people still in need of effective treatment worldwide. And tuberculosis killed nearly 1.3 million people in 2008, with 90 percent of cases affecting the world’s poorest. **America’s investments have** changed—and **saved—millions of lives**, one person at a time. This is no time to stop. Every year, nearly 343,000 mothers die giving birth. Most of these women live in the world’s poorest countries. Women in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, stand a 1 in 26 chance of dying during delivery, compared to a 1 in 4,800 chance for a mother in the United States. Investments in maternal health can deliver lifesaving results. If women had access to basic health services—such as a trained health care worker during delivery—80% of maternal deaths could be prevented. A healthy mother also means stronger, more healthy children. Today, 8.8 million children die before their fifth birthday. **Pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria and the measles—preventable, treatable diseases that are no longer widespread in the United States—are the leading cause of child mortality worldwide**. Children who lose their mothers are 5 times more likely to die in infancy than those who do not. But women who are healthy help ensure that their children attend school, eat as nutritiously as possible, and receive proper immunizations. **Through simple, cost-effective means, we’ve helped cut the number of child deaths in half since 1960.** We can do it again by 2020.

No impact to disease - Extinction genetically impossible and ahistorical. Posner 5**[[15]](#footnote-13)**

Yet the fact that **Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years** or so of its existence **is a source of genuine comfort**, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. **Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality**; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet **there is no danger** that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood **of a** natural **pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past** (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time. That the human race has not yet been destroyed by germs created or made more lethal by modern science, as distinct from completely natural disease agents such as the flu and AIDS viruses, is even less reassuring. We haven't had these products long enough to be able to infer survivability from our experience with them. A recent study suggests that as immunity to smallpox declines because people am no longer being vaccinated against it, monkeypox may evolve into "a successful human pathogen," (9) yet one that vaccination against smallpox would provide at least some protection against; and even before the discovery of the smallpox vaccine, smallpox did not wipe out the human race. What is new is the possibility that science, bypassing evolution, will enable monkeypox to be "juiced up" through gene splicing into a far more lethal pathogen than smallpox ever was.

## AT Heg Bad Prolif

Heg solves proliferation in general– liberalism and security umbrella. **Deudney et. al ’11**[[16]](#footnote-14)

The diffusion of nuclear weapons in the international system is significantly entangled with the role of the unipolar hegemonic state. **The existence of a unipolar state** playing the role of a liberal hegemon **has** arguably **been a major constraint on the rate and extent of prolif**eration. **The** extended military **alliance system** of the United States **has been a** major **reason why many** potentially nuclear **states have forgone acquisition. Starting with Germany and Japan, and extending** to a long **list of** European and East Asian **states**, the American **alliances** are widely understood to **provide a “nuclear umbrella**.” Overall, without such a state playing this role, proliferation would likely have been much more extensive. The liberal features of the American hegemonic sate also have contributed to constrain the rate and extent of proliferation. **American leadership**, and the general liberal internationalist vision of law-governed cooperative international politics, both **enabled** and infuses the **non-prolif**eration **regime**. Similarly, the robust and inclusive liberal world trading system that has been a distinctive and salient feature of the American liberal hegemonic system offers integrating states paths to secure themselves that make nuclear acquisition less attractive.

No impact to prolif---every actor has an incentive to overstate the impact. Farley 11**[[17]](#footnote-15)**

But states and policymakers habitually overestimate the impact of nuclear weapons. This happens among both proliferators and anti-proliferators. Would-be proliferators seem to expect that possessing a nuclear weapon will confer “a seat at the table” as well as solve a host of minor and major foreign policy problems. Existing nuclear powers fear that new entrants will act unpredictably, destabilize regions and throw existing diplomatic arrangements into flux. These predictions almost invariably turn out wrong; nuclear weapons consistently fail to undo the existing power relationships of the international system. ¶ The North Korean example is instructive. In spite of the dire warnings about the dangers of a North Korean nuclear weapon, the region has weathered Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation in altogether sound fashion. Though some might argue that nukes have “enabled” North Korea to engage in a variety of bad behaviors, that was already the case prior to its nuclear test. The crucial deterrent to U.S. or South Korean action continues to be North Korea’s conventional capabilities, as well as the incalculable costs of governing North Korea after a war. Moreover, despite the usual dire predictions of nonproliferation professionals, the North Korean nuclear program has yet to inspire Tokyo or Seoul to follow suit. The DPRK’s program represents a tremendous waste of resources and human capital for a poor state, and it may prove a problem if North Korea endures a messy collapse. Thus far, however, the effects of the arsenal have been minimal. ¶ Israel represents another case in which the benefits of nuclear weapons remain unclear. Although Israel adopted a policy of ambiguity about its nuclear program, most in the region understood that Israel possessed nuclear weapons by the late-1960s. These weapons did not deter Syria or Egypt from launching a large-scale conventional assault in 1973, however. Nor did they help the Israeli Defense Force compel acquiescence in Lebanon in 1982 or 2006. Nuclear weapons have not resolved the Palestinian question, and when it came to removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Israel relied not on its nuclear arsenal but on the United States to do so -- through conventional means -- in 2003. Israeli nukes have thus far failed to intimidate the Iranians into freezing their nuclear program. Moreover, Israel has pursued a defense policy designed around the goal of maintaining superiority at every level of military escalation, from asymmetrical anti-terror efforts to high-intensity conventional combat. Thus, it is unclear whether the nuclear program has even saved Israel any money. ¶ The problem with nukes is that there are strong material and normative pressures against their use, not least because states that use nukes risk incurring nuclear retaliation. Part of the appeal of nuclear weapons is their bluntness, but for foreign policy objectives requiring a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer, they are useless. As a result, states with nuclear neighbors quickly find that they can engage in all manner of harassment and escalation without risking nuclear retaliation. The weapons themselves are often more expensive than the foreign policy objectives that they would be used to attain. Moreover, normative pressures do matter. Even “outlaw” nations recognize that the world views the use of nuclear -- not to mention chemical or biological -- weapons differently than other expressions of force. And almost without exception, even outlaw nations require the goodwill of at least some segments of the international community. ¶ Given all this, it is not at all surprising that many countries eschew nuclear programs, even when they could easily attain nuclear status. Setting aside the legal problems, nuclear programs tend to be expensive, and they provide relatively little in terms of foreign policy return on investment. Brazil, for example, does not need nuclear weapons to exercise influence in Latin America or deter its rivals. Turkey, like Germany, Japan and South Korea, decided a long time ago that the nuclear “problem” could be solved most efficiently through alignment with an existing nuclear power. ¶ Why do policymakers, analysts and journalists so consistently overrate the importance of nuclear weapons? The answer is that everyone has a strong incentive to lie about their importance. The Iranians will lie to the world about the extent of their program and to their people about the fruits of going nuclear. The various U.S. client states in the region will lie to Washington about how terrified they are of a nuclear Iran, warning of the need for “strategic re-evaluation,” while also using the Iranian menace as an excuse for brutality against their own populations. Nonproliferation advocates will lie about the terrors of unrestrained proliferation because they do not want anyone to shift focus to the manageability of a post-nuclear Iran. The United States will lie to everyone in order to reassure its clients and maintain the cohesion of the anti-Iran block. ¶ None of these lies are particularly dishonorable; they represent the normal course of diplomacy. But they are lies nevertheless, and serious analysts of foreign policy and international relations need to be wary of them. ¶ Nonproliferation is a good idea, if only because states should not waste tremendous resources on weapons of limited utility. Nuclear weapons also represent a genuine risk of accidents, especially for states that have not yet developed appropriately robust security precautions. Instability and collapse in nuclear states has been harrowing in the past and will undoubtedly be harrowing in the future. All of these threats should be taken seriously by policymakers. Unfortunately, as long as deception remains the rule in the practice of nuclear diplomacy, exaggerated alarmism will substitute for a realistic appraisal of the policy landscape.

## AT Heg Bad Terror

Hegemony deters terrorists ---- decline emboldens them. **Walt ’02[[18]](#footnote-16)**

Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy—and why the United States benefits from its current position—is that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. Because the United States is so powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever problems it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order.7 The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion.  When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West’s oil supplies; in 1990–91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, **when the U**nited **S**tates **was attacked by** the **Al-Qaeda** terrorist network in September 2001, **it had the wherewithal to oust the network’s Taliban hosts and** to **compel** broad **international support** for its campaign **to eradicate Al-Qaeda** itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had been weaker. Today, U.S. **primacy helps deter potential challenges** to American interests in virtually every part of the world. **Few** countries or nonstate **groups want** to invite **the “focused enmity” of the U**nited **S**tates (to use William Wohlforth’s apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist bombings) that do not seriously threaten America’s dominant position. **Were American power to decline** significantly, however, **groups opposed to U.S. interests would** probably **be emboldened and overt challenges** would be **more likely**.

Case controls a stronger internal link anyways because even if terrorists want to lash out against the United States, they do not have the capability unless they can get a bomb across the border, which they need cartels for.

## AT Constitution DA

Fiat solves the link, the constitution allows for provisions to change it and the AFF fiats that those take place meaning that there is no violation.

No-Uniqueness we violate the constitution all the time. **Shapiro 14[[19]](#footnote-17)**

One of Barack Obama’s chief accomplishments has been to return the Constitution to a central place in our public discourse. Unfortunately, **the** **president** **fomented this upswing** in civic interest not by talking up the constitutional aspects of his policy agenda, but **by blatantly violating** the strictures of **our founding document**. And he’s been most frustrated with the separation of powers, which doesn’t allow him to “fundamentally transform” the country without congressional acquiescence. But that hasn’t stopped him. In its first term, the Administration launched a “We Can’t Wait” initiative, with senior aide Dan Pfeiffer explaining that “when Congress won’t act, this president will.” And earlier this year, President Obama said in announcing his new economic plans that “I will not allow gridlock, or inaction, or willful indifference to get in our way.” And so, as we reach the end of another year of political strife that’s fundamentally based on clashing views on the role of government in society, I thought I’d update a list I made two years ago and hereby present President Obama’s top 10 constitutional violations of 2013. 1. Delay of Obamacare’s out-of-pocket caps. **The Labor Department announced** in February that **it was delaying** for a year the **part of the healthcare law** that limits how much people have to spend on their own insurance. This may have been sensible—insurers and employers need time to comply with rapidly changing regulations—**but changing the law requires** actual **legislation**. 2. Delay of Obamacare’s employer mandate. The administration announced via blogpost on the eve of the July 4 holiday that it was delaying the requirement that employers of at least 50 people provide complying insurance or pay a fine. This time it did cite statutory authority, but the cited provisions allow the delay of certain reporting requirements, not of the mandate itself. 3. Delay of Obamacare’s insurance requirements. The famous pledge that “if you like your plan, you can keep it” backfired when insurance companies started cancelling millions of plans that didn’t comply with Obamacare’s requirements. President Obama called a press conference last month to proclaim that people could continue buying non-complying plans in 2014—despite Obamacare’s explicit language to the contrary. He then refused to consider a House-passed bill that would’ve made this action legal. 4. Exemption of Congress from Obamacare. A little-known part of Obamacare requires Congressmen and their staff to get insurance through the new healthcare exchanges, rather than a taxpayer-funded program. In the quiet of August, President Obama directed the Office of Personnel Management to interpret the law to maintain the generous congressional benefits. 5. Expansion of the employer mandate penalty through IRS regulation. Obamacare grants tax credits to people whose employers don’t provide coverage if they buy a plan “through an Exchange established by the State”—and then fines employers for each employee receiving such a subsidy. No tax credits are authorized for residents of states where the exchanges are established by the federal government, as an incentive for states to create exchanges themselves. Because so few (16) states did, however, the IRS issued a rule ignoring that plain text and allowed subsidies (and commensurate fines) for plans coming from “a State Exchange, regional Exchange, subsidiary Exchange, and federally-facilitated Exchange.” 6. Political profiling by the IRS. After seeing a rise in the number of applications for tax-exempt status, **the IRS in 2010 compiled a** “be on the lookout” (“**BOLO**”) **list** to identify organizations engaged in political activities. **The list included words such as “Tea Party,” “Patriots,” and “Israel”;** subjects such as government spending, debt, or taxes; **and activities such as criticizing the government**, educating about the Constitution, or challenging Obamacare. The targeting continued through May of this year. 7. Outlandish Supreme Court arguments. Between January 2012 and June 2013, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Justice Department’s extreme positions 9 times. The cases ranged from criminal procedure to property rights, religious liberty to immigration, securities regulation to tax law. They had nothing in common other than the government’s view that federal power is virtually unlimited. As a comparison, in the entire Bush and Clinton presidencies, the government suffered 15 and 23 unanimous rulings, respectively. 8. Recess appointments. Last year, President Obama appointed three members of the National Labor Relations Board, as well as the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, during what he considered to be a Senate recess. But the Senate was still holding “pro forma” sessions every three days—a technique developed by Sen. Harry Reid to thwart Bush recess appointments. (Meanwhile, the Dodd-Frank Act, which created the CFPB, provides that authority remains with the Treasury Secretary until a director is “confirmed by the Senate.”) In January, the D.C. Circuit held the NLRB appointments to be unconstitutional, which ruling White House spokesman Jay Carney said only applied to “one court, one case, one company.” 9. Assault on free speech and due process on college campuses. Responding to complaints about the University of Montana’s handling of sexual assault claims, the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights, in conjunction with the Justice Department, sent the university a letter intended as a national “blueprint” for tackling sexual harassment. The letter urges a crackdown on “unwelcome” speech and requires complaints to be heard in quasi-judicial procedures that deny legal representation, encourage punishment before trial, and convict based on a mere “more likely than not” standard. 10. Mini-DREAM Act. **Congress** has shamelessly **failed to pass** any sort of **immigration reform**, including for the most sympathetic victims of the current non-system, young people who were brought into the country illegally as children. **Nonetheless**, President **Obama**, contradicting his own previous statements claiming to lack authority, **directed** **the** Department of Homeland Security to issue **work and residence permits** to the so-called Dreamers. The executive branch undoubtedly has discretion regarding enforcement priorities, but **granting de facto green cards goes beyond a decision to defer deportation in certain cases**. It was hard to limit myself to 10 items, of course—Obamacare alone could’ve filled many such lists—but these, in my judgment, represent the chief executive’s biggest dereliction this year of his duty to “preserve, protect, and defend” the Constitution, and to “take care that the law be faithfully executed.” Alas, things may get worse before they get better. New presidential “counselor” John Podesta’s belief in governance by fiat is no secret; in a 2010 report, he wrote that focusing on executive power “presents a real opportunity for the Obama administration to turn its focus away from a divided Congress and the unappetizing process of making legislative sausage.” Happy New Year!

No Impact– our position in the world is the same whether people hate us or not. Kagan, 06**[[20]](#footnote-18)**

The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which **America remains** what Bill Clinton once called "**the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility** to George W. Bush's United States, **the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different** from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war. **The** much-anticipated global **effort to balance against American hegemony** -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- **has simply not occurred**. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it. Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. **Germany's new government**, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, **is working hard** and ostentatiously **to improve relations**. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. **For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America**, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?

## AT Elections DA [Dems Good]

Uniqueness overwhelms the link, the Republican Party looks like an absolute circus and the have a clown as the frontrunner, there’s no way Hillary wont win.

Case outweighs on timeframe all my impact scenarios will be triggered before the next president is even elected let alone before they can pass any policies.

DA non-intrinsic a logical policymaker could do the AFF and then pass whatever policies will solve the impact.

Your disad is wrong, gun control, and no other single issue is big enough to swing the election, especially at this point. **Silver 15**[[21]](#footnote-19)

If you were to rank the most exciting presidential nomination contests, the 1996 Republican race would be near the bottom. Bob Dole, the “next-in-line” GOP candidate and the Senate majority leader, built up a huge lead in polls and endorsements early in the race and was never seriously challenged for the nomination. Dole did lose the New Hampshire primary by a single point to Pat Buchanan. But the field soon consolidated around him, and he went on to win 44 of 50 states. And yet, contemporaneous accounts of the sleepy-seeming 1996 campaign portrayed it as incredibly dramatic, full of “unexpected” twists and “unpredictable” turns. Take this March 7, 1996, article from The New York Times, for example — it was written after Dole had won 12 consecutive primaries and caucuses in the previous week. There are four expressions of surprise in a single paragraph: It’s taken as shocking that the early primaries were as competitive as they were, but equally “striking” that Dole rebounded so quickly from them. After an unpredictable early stretch of primaries, where candidates seemed to flicker out like trick birthday candles, only to re-ignite unexpectedly, Mr. Dole’s return to a commanding lead so early in the voting was striking. The positioning and sorting of the field yesterday was particularly unusual: Almost simultaneously, Mr. Lugar and Mr. Alexander bowed out, as Governor Bush and Mr. Kemp put forth their dueling endorsements. I don’t mean to pick on this article, which happens to have been written by a terrific journalist,1 but it’s typical of the breathless fashion in which developments on the campaign trail are reported. There is a constant series of overcorrections in the conventional wisdom. In this case, because the initial threat to Dole was overstated by the press — Buchanan, a factional candidate, had little chance to see his support grow beyond the 27 percent of the vote he won in New Hampshire2 — Dole’s “comeback” was incorrectly portrayed as unexpected and dramatic. These biases hold in coverage of the general election too, of course: There were 68 purported “game changers” in the 2012 general election, **most** of which turned out to be irrelevant. But for the political observer trying to sift faux game changers from genuine twists in the campaign, the primaries present a couple of additional complications. First, there are far more opportunities to be “surprised” in the primaries. Let’s start with the most basic stuff. In a nomination race, there might be a dozen or more candidates, instead of just two. And states vote one at a time, instead of all at once. Furthermore, in a nomination race, there is an abundance of metrics by which you might judge the campaigns: national polls, Iowa polls, New Hampshire polls, favorability ratings, endorsements, fundraising, staffing, even crowd sizes and yard signs. Eventually, we’ll also be able to look at delegates, which can be counted in many different ways. For any of these metrics, you can report on the level of support (“Hillary Clinton is polling at 48 percent”), the trend (“she’s lost 4 percentage points since last month”), or even the second derivative (“she’s losing ground, but not as quickly as before”). Multiply 23 candidates3 by 10 metrics by three ways of reporting on those metrics, and you have 690 opportunities to be “surprised” at any given time. In a sense, the primaries are a lot like the NCAA basketball tournament: You know there are going to be some surprises. The odds of every favorite winning every game in the NCAA tournament are longer than a billion-to-one against. And yet, in the end, one of the front-runners usually wins. (Since the men’s tournament expanded to 64 teams in 1985, all but three champions have been No. 4 seeds or better.) So be wary **of grand pronouncements about What It All Means based on** a handful of “**surprising” developments**. Is Scott Walker’s campaign off to an “unexpectedly” bad start, for instance? Maybe. (I wouldn’t be thrilled if I were one of Walker’s strategists. I’d also remind myself that we have five months to go before the Iowa caucuses.) Even if you grant that Walker is having some problems, however, it would be stunning if all the Democratic and Republican campaigns were doing exactly as well as pundits anticipated. At any given moment, some campaigns are bound to be struggling to meet expectations, or exceeding them. Similarly, while one might not have predicted that Bernie Sanders would be the one to do it, it was reasonably likely that some rival would emerge to Hillary Clinton. It’s happened for every non-incumbent front-runner in the past: Buchanan for Dole; Bill Bradley for Al Gore. The other big difference between the general election and primaries is that **polls** are not very reliable in the primaries. They improve as you get closer to the election, although only up to a point. But they **have** little meaning now, five months before the first states vote. It’s not only that the polls have a poor predictive track record — at this point in the past four competitive races, the leaders in national polls were Joe Lieberman, Rudy Giuliani, Hillary Clinton and Rick Perry, none of whom won the nomination — but **also** that **they** don’t have a lot of intrinsic meaning. At this point, the **polls you see reported on are** surveying broad groups of Republican- or Democratic-leaning **adults who are relatively unlikely to actually vote** in the primaries and caucuses and who haven’t been paying all that much attention to the campaigns. The ones who eventually do vote will have been subjected to hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of advertising, had their door knocked on several times, and seen a half-dozen more debates. The ballots they see may not resemble the one the pollsters are testing since it’s likely that (at least on the GOP side) several of the candidates will have dropped out by the time their state votes. Some reporters object to this by saying that the polls are meaningful to the extent that they influence the behavior of the campaigns: If Joe Biden enters the race because he reads the polls as indicating that Clinton is vulnerable, that could matter, for instance. Fair enough. But it’s dubious to compare hypothesized behavior with actual outcomes we’ve seen in past election years. If Biden or Mitt Romney thinks the field is weak and makes a late entry, that will be interesting. If Donald Trump or Sanders actually wins the nomination or comes very close to doing so, that will be a watershed in American political history. But there’s a high rate of false alarms compared with the number of late-entry candidates that actually make a bid or watershed moments that actually occur. None of this is to imply that nominations are all that easy to forecast. And some things this year have been genuinely surprising. In particular, that there are 17 Republican candidates, including a dozen or so who have traditional credentials for the White House, is unprecedented. If you want to develop a theory about how “this time is different,” figuring out how to explain the size of the Republican field (and how it might affect the race) seems like a good starting point. Oddly, this abundance of candidates has been somewhat taken for granted in campaign coverage, even though it potentially plays a big role in explaining Trump’s position in the polls, among other things. The reason may be that it’s something we’ve known about for a long time; there aren’t a lot of clicks to be had from the headline “17 Candidates Still Running; Nothing Else Much Changed Today.” Chasing down the bright, shiny object is more exciting, but usually not more revealing.

[Insert Impact Defense]

## AT Elections DA [Dems Bad]

Non-Unique, the republican party looks like an absolute circus with a clown as their frontrunner, there’s no way Hillary wont win.

Case outweighs on timeframe all my impact scenarios will be triggered before the next president is even elected let alone before they can pass any policies.

DA non-intrinsic a logical policymaker could do the AFF and then pass whatever policies will solve the impact.

Gun control is a major issue for the 2016 election—its unpopularity will get pinned to Democrats and cause GOP victory. **Tani 15[[22]](#footnote-20)**

After years of ducking presidential-campaign battles over gun laws out of fear of the powerful gun lobby, it appears that Democrats are finally ready to go on the offensive. **Democrats are becoming more** and more **outspoken about gun violence in the wake of** seemingly ever **increasing mass shootings**, despite the fact that the American public remains as opposed as ever to many gun-control measures. And the increase in mass shootings has guaranteed that candidates will have to address the issue on the campaign trail, **setting it up to become a major issue in the** 2016 presidential **election**. Democratic presidential front-runner Hillary **Clinton**, for example, set the tone early in her campaign after a mass shooting at a historically African-American church in Charleston, South Carolina. And she **has become much more vocal in her calls for stricter gun laws, making it a recurring feature in her stump speeches.** "**This is a controversial issue**. I am well aware of that. But I think it is the height of irresponsibility not to talk about it," Clinton said this week, according to The Washington Post. Clinton's increased calls for gun control mirror President Barack Obama's recent shift to refocus on gun laws in the wake of a slew of mass shootings. In addition to the Charleston incident, there have been high-profile mass shootings at military facilities in Tennessee and at a movie theater in Louisiana. **Obama** has labeled the failure of Congress to pass new gun laws the biggest frustration of his tenure. He **has spoken out multiple times recently** on the subject, including after the Charleston shooting that killed nine people. "I've had to make statements like this too many times," Obama said in a statement from the White House. "At some point, we as a country will have to reckon with the fact that this type of mass violence does not happen in other developed countries." This is a major shift from 2008, when both Clinton and Obama were criticized for failing to talk about the issue. During the heat of the 2012 campaign, Obama was reluctant to bring up the topic of guns even after the mass shooting at a Colorado movie theater. **Passing gun-control measures**, Democrats have long argued, **had helped lead Democrats to overwhelming losses** in the 1994 midterms, which swept Republicans into power in Congress. **The new focus, then, is an interesting political calculus — because many signs actually show that Americans' support for gun rights is growing**.

[Insert Impact defense]

## AT Protectionism DA

Your internal link is ridiculously tiny, there is no way that preventing the import of handguns would cause other countries go to war given that we will still import literally everything else.

This also isn’t even protectionism because we aren’t protecting U.S handgun manufacturers given the fact that they can’t sell in America either.

We can still import handguns they just have to go to the police instead of private citizens.

Empirics prove trade doesn’t solve war. Martin et. al. ‘8**[[23]](#footnote-21)**

**Does globalization pacify international relations**? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, **the correlation** between trade openness and military conflicts **is not** a **clear** cut one. **The first era of globalization**, at the end of the 19th century, **was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts**, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). **There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower** prevalence of **military conflicts**, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

## AT Race DA

No uniqueness incarceration is high now and there is no way the AFF substantially increases it.

AFF outweighs incarceration because over time we can make progress in incarceration as long as people are alive, however extinction would make that impossible functionally link turning the disad.

No link your evidence refers to a situation where gun control is disproportionately enforced for certain groups however I fait that the AFF is enforced for all Americans equally.

Not a D-rule, voting solely based on racial politics is as shallow as Spike TV-all components of an issue must be weighed in making a decision. **Bradley 8[[24]](#footnote-22)**

With only a few weeks to Election Day, racial politics has reared its pathetic head as pundits attempt to decipher poll numbers and audience comments at political rallies. It seems silly to imagine that adults in America may vote along racial lines but it should come as no surprise. Many people on the ideological margins of society vote irrationally. In fact, **voting along racial lines says less about racism than it does about the lack of mature civic responsibility among voters who are indifferent to the nation’s common good**. While using race as an ultimate criterion for supporting or rejecting a candidate is equally unjustifiable and shallow, the possibility of doing exactly that is one of the trade-offs of being free. Positively, **freedom permits us to choose a candidate according to important issues such as his or her positions on abortion**, the role of government in meeting the needs of the poor, foreign policy, and education. I am happy to live in a country with this type of liberty rather than a regime where I have no role in choosing leaders to represent me. When I hear African Americans, Latinos, and Asians lament, “It’s 2008 and racism still exists in America,” I want to shout, “What fairytale were you reading that said racism would ever cease?” One of the historic tenets of Judeo-Christianity, along with many other religions, is that evil exists in the world. As long as people lack the moral formation to escape it, **there will always be racism**. What is most alarming about the media’s recent displays of racial politics is that **many American voters do not have the civic virtue to put their personal racial views aside for the sake of what is best for the nation.** Race does not determine a person’s position on issues. **Do Maxine Waters and Condoleezza Rice think alike simply because they are both black women**? Shallow voting is the art of the imperceptive. In light of the gargantuan issues facing the nation—the conflicts in the Middle East, the nationalization of American banking, transitions in our use of energy, new international partnerships among socialist regimes in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, and the multi-layered issues in Africa—we should be embarrassed as a nation for the world to see people downgrade the presidential election to gene preferences. What **Americans must embrace** is **their responsibility as virtuous citizens concerned about the common good. This means that we put non-essential issues like race aside**, to choose a candidate with the character and competence necessary to offer leadership on the pressing issues of our times.

## AT Court Legit DA

The court is illegitimate now partisanship on a recent immigration case proves. **Denniston 1/20[[25]](#footnote-23)**

**Has the court now inflicted a new wound on its reputation as a citadel of justice by reaching out to expand its review of** President **Obama’s** broad **new immigration policy** on delayed deportation of upwards of four million undocumented immigrants?  Did it need to add a constitutional question that may seem like a broader threat to the policy? A recital of the facts may help sort out the implications of the court’s choice to tell the lawyers in the case of United States v. Texas to include in their briefs and oral arguments their answers to a question under Article II of the Constitution: Whether the new policy violates the Take Care Clause? First, the 26 states that sued to challenge the new deferred deportation policy have been raising that issue from the start of the case. But, second, in preliminary rulings blocking the new policy temporarily, **two lower federal courts chose not to decide anything about the constitutional question**.  **Their decisions were based on federal laws** that govern the use of administrative law by government agencies. Third, **in taking the case to the Supreme Court** seeking review of the lower court orders, **the Obama administration chose to focus only on the administrative law** questions, along with the procedural question of whether the states had a right to sue at all; the government’s theory on that point is that the policy does no injury to them at all, so they have no genuine grievance. Fourth, in urging the court not to hear the case at this point (it has not yet gone to a trial on the merits of the policy’s legality), the challenging states said that, if review were granted, the court should answer their constitutional claim, too Fifth, the administration then countered with the customary argument that the issue had not been decided in the lower courts and thus should not be examined, in the first instance, by the Justices.  Besides, it argued, the constitutional claim did not add anything to the states’ challenge based on federal laws. **The court** considered all of this at a private conference last Friday and then **disclosed on Tuesday that it was going to hear** the government appeal on the federal law questions – plus **the added question** – as posed by the states – **about a claimed violation of the Take Care Clause.** That clause reads this way: “The President shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”  **It is a part of the Constitution that has seldom come up in court cases; when it does, those few cases tend to turn on what it means to “faithfully” execute the laws**.  That is a sufficiently difficult inquiry that the court should, indeed, try to avoid dealing with it. It chose otherwise.  Its choice raises these issues: Was it trying to show a balance, reviewing what the government wanted but also what the states had put forward? Could it actually decide the overall validity of the policy without settling its constitutionality – an issue that would hang over the policy; Did it want to short-circuit the continuation of the case in the lower courts by wrapping up the dispute altogether by itself? But it also may suggest these issues: **Did some of the Justices, at least, want to make it harder for the government to salvage its polic**y; Did some of them want to send a signal that the court really does have doubts about the policy’s constitutionality and those doubts are serious enough to break from the usual practice of avoiding such questions; **Have some of them actually viewed the policy through a political lens**? Some answers may emerge when the case is argued in April, or when the final decision comes out.  Or the court’s motives may remain forever unknown to the public.  This is the kind of thing it usually feels no need to explain.

Fiat means that I can change the Supreme Court decision, which means it’s no longer contradictory and solves the impact.

The DA outlines that it solves war but doesn’t outline any specific wars that could be solved by the court that would otherwise exist in the world of the AFF. So you should prefer my evidence on specificity.

Hegemony solves the impact; it deters conflicts from starting before they do so we don’t need the court to check because we won’t intervene anywhere.

Your internal link and impact cards are both close to thirty years old, which means they’re probably no longer relevant to the courts.

## AT Excise Tax DA

This might be the worst disad on the topic, obviously if we banned handguns they would make up the relatively small amount of funding from either assault weapon sales or something else, even if the government wouldn’t the DA isn’t intrinsic.

There is absolutely no brink anywhere just because there is some loss in park funding that doesn’t necessarily mean that species will go extinct in such a large scale that an impact is triggered.

Even if they do win some impact to BioD that’s seriously not a big deal, it won’t cascade and nature won’t implode, your shit is based and mine is backed by data. Kareiva et al 12**[[26]](#footnote-24)**

As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost. But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem. The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24 The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects. These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25 While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28 Nature is so resilient that it can recover rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving, despite the high levels of radiation.29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate.31 Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well  to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse. Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals. Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again. The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity.

**AT Hunting DA**

This disad is kindof a joke so I don’t need more then like fifteen seconds, if you’ve ever gone hunting you would know that using a handgun would make you look like an absolute jackass, everyone uses shotguns or rifles, which is why their internal link card is so bad, it just says that some people use handguns, obviously they need to win more of an internal link then that.

Lymes diseases doesn’t have a link to extinction so, the AFF outweighs that’s the 1AC Bostrom evidence. Also I’ve had lymes, and it isn’t even that bad grow up and get over it.

Lastly pesticides and vaccines both solve the impact

AT Lone Wolf DA

Internal link evidence isn’t as good as they make it seem, it just says that gun control would make people mad obviously there’s a huge disconnect between that and actual terrorism

The people that want to keep their guns in this card are the most patriotic terrorist hating people in the country, they’re very unlikely to attack.

Those dipshits in Oregon prove these people don’t escalate even if they do lash out.

Prefer the impacts in the AFF that are about actual groups like ISIS because they have the organizational capacity and funds to actually mount a threat, which one guy simply doesn’t, also they don’t exist. Friedman 12**[[27]](#footnote-25)**,

**Homegrown terrorism is not** becoming more common and **dangerous** in the United States, contrary to warnings issuing regularly from Washington. **American jihadists** attempting local attacks **are** predictably **incompetent, making them even less dangerous than their rarity suggests**.¶ Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are among legions of experts and officials who have recently warned of a rise in homegrown terrorism, meaning terrorist acts or plots carried out by American citizens or long-term residents, often without guidance from foreign organisations.¶ But homegrown American terrorism is not new.¶ Leon Czolgosz, the anarchist who assassinated President McKinley in 1901, was a native-born American who got no foreign help. The same goes for John Wilkes Booth, Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray. The deadliest act of domestic terrorism in U.S. history, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, was largely the work of New York-born Gulf War vet, Timothy McVeigh.¶ As Brian Michael Jenkins of RAND notes, there is far less homegrown terrorism today than in the 1970s, when the Weather Underground, the Jewish Defense League, anti-Castro Cuban exile groups, and the Puerto Rican Nationalists of the FALN were setting off bombs on U.S. soil.¶ There was an increase in homegrown terrorism arrests in the late 2000s, with the decade's high coming in 2009. That year saw the decade's deadliest act of homegrown terrorism when Nidal Hasan killed thirteen people at Ft. Hood. Homegrown terrorism has declined since. According a report published earlier this year by Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina, arrests of homegrown terrorists fell from 47 in 2009 to 20 in 2011. No more successful plots have occurred.¶ There are reasons to doubt that the recent increase in homegrown terrorism arrests reflected an increase in actual terrorism. One reason is random variation. Because a run of aces may be due to chance, it does make the next gamble is good one. Similarly, a spate of homegrown terrorism does not necessarily indicate a continuing trend.¶ Second, as Jenkins notes, a sizeable minority of those arrested for terrorism in the late 2000s were U.S. nationals trying to help the al-Shabaab group in Somalia, either by recruiting, fundraising or joining its ranks. That counts as terrorism because the U.S. government categories al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation and criminalises support for it. But it is an insurgent organisation chiefly interested in Somalia politics that has not attempted terrorism in the United States. With Ethiopian forces occupying parts of Somalia from 2006-2009, many in the Somali diaspora saw support for al-Shabaab as a defense of their homeland. Those that aid or join it are not necessarily interested in terrorism, let alone terrorism against Americans.¶ Third, U.S. authorities began to search harder for terrorists at home. After the September 11, the FBI received a massive boost in counterterrorism funding and shifted a small army of agents from crime-fighting to counterterrorism. Many joined new Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Ambitious prosecutors increasingly looked for terrorists to indict. Most states stood up intelligence fusion centers, which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) soon fed with threat intelligence.¶ The intensification of the search was bound to produce more arrests, even without more terrorism, just as the Inquisition was sure to find more witches. Of course, unlike the witches, only a minority of those found by this search are innocent. But many seem like suggestible idiots unlikely to have produced workable plots without the help of FBI informants or undercover agents taught to induce criminal conduct without engaging in entrapment.¶ Take Rezwan Ferdaus, the 26-year-old who lived with his parents outside Boston before his arrest last fall. He allegedly planned to fly small remote-controlled airplanes carrying a few pounds of explosives into the Pentagon and Capitol dome, assuming they would easily collapse. A second attack would somehow destroy the bridges at the Pentagon complex, before a six-man team armed with AK-47s attacked the survivors. Happily, Ferdaus had no accomplices, aside from those provided by the FBI, no money for the planes, other than what the FBI loaned him, and no explosives, beyond fakes sort that the FBI provides.¶ The officials and pundits most worried about homegrown terrorists claim that Americans are lucky to have enemies like Ferdaus. They say the same of Faizal Shahzad, whose car bomb failed to explode in Times Square, Nazibullah Zazi, who could not make a working bomb despite the training he got on the subject in Pakistan, and the many other incompetents that have lately attempted terrorism in the United States.¶ **Homegrown** American **jihadists cannot acquire the funds and training needed** for terroristic expertise. Most would quickly kill themselves once they achieved it despite their serial failure, U.S. leaders describe homegrown terrorists as cunning and their threat as great. Napolitano says they are especially dangerous because they can come from "any direction, and with little or no warning." Mueller warns that they "understand our culture, our security protocols, and our vulnerabilities. They use the Internet, social media, and marketing skills to influence like-minded individuals."¶ The failure of U.S.-born jihadists, however, reflects more than luck. There are at least two good reasons for it. The first is al Qaeda's ideology. By supporting the murder of most people, including most Muslims, al Qaeda ensures that it remains wildly unpopular in most places. Their ideology is especially noxious to those living in coherent, liberal societies like the United States. Americans drawn to al Qaeda are likely to be a troubled and disaffected lot, lacking traits that most organisations value in recruits.¶ A more important reason source of failure is organisational weakness. Mass violence has historically been the product of bureaucratic, hierarchical organisations that belong to states or insurgencies resembling them. Only bureaucratic organisations who have the tools train and motivate many to act on the orders of a few, which is historically how mass violence with small arms occurred. As agents of states or other **organisations** that monopolise violence, bureaucratic **organisations** alone **have got the physical security, expertise and capital need to manufacture mass killing weapons** like artillery, strike aircraft, and nuclear weapons.¶ Because they are generally clandestine, terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents.¶ Homegrown American jihadists, who generally lack guidance even from al Qaeda's withering core, are about the least organised terrorists imaginable. They cannot acquire the funds and training needed for terroristic expertise. Most would quickly kill themselves once they achieved it.¶ Contrary to much recent analysis, the internet does not solve these problems. As Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has shown, online guides to bomb-making, poison manufacture and other tools of mayhem provide unreliable information. Authorities can monitor such sites or set up their own to mislead or trap malfeasants.¶ Moreover, internet-based instruction does not provide the sort of rapid interaction between trainer and trainee that characterises most successful training in complex tasks. The internet is an even more useless for mastering acts of violence that require teamwork. There is a reason why organisations that effectively coordinate activity, whether it is the Marines Corps or Real Madrid, avoid virtual training.¶ If DHS is right that homegrown terrorists are now a bigger threat than the international variety, we should celebrate. Even if American-born jihadists grow more numerous and skilled, which now seems unlikely, they will remain far less deadly than the terrorist supervillains we have been taught to expect. They will never compare to big risks to American longevity like heart disease and depression.

AT Historic Race K

Past uses of gun control are only racist because of their intentions to make blacks unable to protect themselves. Therefore the AFF does not link because the intention of the AFF is just to bolster relations and stop cartels.

Res K links aren’t links, there are certain things that I’m textually bound to fiating, but that obviously doesn’t mean that I endorse every single representational issue about them.

Extinction takes out the Alt because of everyone is dead it is impossible for people to actually do anything to change the status quo.

Permutation do both: Reforms are possible and desirable---tangible change outweighs the risk of cooption and is still a better strategy than the alt. **Omi 13[[28]](#footnote-26)**

In Feagin and Elias's account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron – a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. **The US**A is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it **is** also in many respects **a racial democracy,** capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites – employment, health, education – persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. **US racial conditions have changed** over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the **Voting Rights** Act, the **Immigration and Naturalization Act** (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like **Loving v. Virginia** that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson's famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 – ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ – count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, **hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition** (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime – under movement pressure – was exercising its hegemony. **But** Gramsci insists that such **reforms** – which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ – cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that **further victories can take place both on** the broad terrain of the state **and** on the more immediate level of social interaction: in **daily interaction**, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others. **By no means do we think that the** post-war movement **upsurge was an unmitigated success**. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. **Yet even their incorporation** and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, **reveal the** transformative character **of the ‘politicization of the social’**. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today.

Alt fails – abstract movements won’t produce political results besides violence – embrace the hard work of pragmatic reform. **Condit 15[[29]](#footnote-27)**

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us **to “Act**” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, **we can call** his appeal both a failure of imagination and **a** failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and **the historical record indicates** quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the **production of** totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All **symbolic movement has a trajectory**, and **if you have not** imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what **people will** leap into is **biological predispositions**—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard **work to invent better alternatives is not as** dramatically **enticing as the story of the kill**: such **labor is** piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But **if one does not provide a** viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, **then** Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

Policy focus is key – lack of policy focus destroys hope for change. **Light and Katz 96**[[30]](#footnote-28)

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precasrious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is **yes. Despite the problematic** (and, heretofore, ineffectual) **status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates** in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; **we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems**; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. **Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact.** In short, environmental **ethics must develop** for itself a methodology of environmental **pragmatism** – fueled by a recognition that **theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy**. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, **environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment**. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

Let me weigh the AFF, voting solely based on racial politics is as shallow as Spike TV-all components of an issue must be weighed in making a decision. **Bradley 8[[31]](#footnote-29)**

With only a few weeks to Election Day, racial politics has reared its pathetic head as pundits attempt to decipher poll numbers and audience comments at political rallies. It seems silly to imagine that adults in America may vote along racial lines but it should come as no surprise. Many people on the ideological margins of society vote irrationally. In fact, **voting along racial lines says less about racism than it does about the lack of mature civic responsibility among voters who are indifferent to the nation’s common good**. While using race as an ultimate criterion for supporting or rejecting a candidate is equally unjustifiable and shallow, the possibility of doing exactly that is one of the trade-offs of being free. Positively, **freedom permits us to choose a candidate according to important issues such as his or her positions on abortion**, the role of government in meeting the needs of the poor, foreign policy, and education. I am happy to live in a country with this type of liberty rather than a regime where I have no role in choosing leaders to represent me. When I hear African Americans, Latinos, and Asians lament, “It’s 2008 and racism still exists in America,” I want to shout, “What fairytale were you reading that said racism would ever cease?” One of the historic tenets of Judeo-Christianity, along with many other religions, is that evil exists in the world. As long as people lack the moral formation to escape it, **there will always be racism**. What is most alarming about the media’s recent displays of racial politics is that **many American voters do not have the civic virtue to put their personal racial views aside for the sake of what is best for the nation.** Race does not determine a person’s position on issues. **Do Maxine Waters and Condoleezza Rice think alike simply because they are both black women**? Shallow voting is the art of the imperceptive. In light of the gargantuan issues facing the nation—the conflicts in the Middle East, the nationalization of American banking, transitions in our use of energy, new international partnerships among socialist regimes in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, and the multi-layered issues in Africa—we should be embarrassed as a nation for the world to see people downgrade the presidential election to gene preferences. What **Americans must embrace** is **their responsibility as virtuous citizens concerned about the common good. This means that we put non-essential issues like race aside**, to choose a candidate with the character and competence necessary to offer leadership on the pressing issues of our times.

## AT Cap K

Cap solves war. **Bandow 5[[32]](#footnote-30)**

In a world that seems constantly aflame, one naturally asks: **What causes peace**? Many people, including U.S. President George W. Bush, hope that spreading democracy will discourage war. But new research suggests that **expanding free markets is a far more important factor**, leading to what Columbia University's Erik Gartzke calls a "capitalist peace." It's a reason for even the left to support free markets. The capitalist peace theory isn't new: Montesquieu and Adam Smith believed in it. Many of Britain's classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden, pushed free markets while opposing imperialism. But World War I demonstrated that increased trade was not enough. The prospect of economic ruin did not prevent rampant nationalism, ethnic hatred, and security fears from trumping the power of markets. An even greater conflict followed a generation later. Thankfully, World War II left war essentially unthinkable among leading industrialized - and democratic - states. Support grew for the argument, going back to Immanual Kant, that **republics are less warlike than other systems**. Today's corollary is that creating democracies out of dictatorships will reduce conflict. This contention animated some support outside as well as inside the United States for the invasion of Iraq. But Gartzke argues that "the 'democratic peace' is a mirage created by the overlap between economic and political freedom." That is, **democracies typically have freer economies than do authoritarian states.** Thus, while "democracy is desirable for many reasons," he notes in a chapter in the latest volume of Economic Freedom in the World, created by the Fraser Institute, "representative governments are unlikely to contribute directly to international peace." Capitalism is by far the more important factor. The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war. **Markets generate** economic **opportunities** that **make war less desirable**. Territorial aggrandizement no longer provides the best path to riches. Free-**flowing capital markets** and other aspects of globalization **simultaneously** draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict. Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war to achieve foreign policy ends. Positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then, neither is democracy. It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight, just usually not each other. Contends Gartzke, "liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether states fight." In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. He explains: "Democracy does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14 times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels." Gartzke considers other variables, including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences. Although the causes of conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains. His conclusion hasn't gone unchallenged. Author R.J. Rummel, an avid proponent of the democratic peace theory, challenges Gartzke's methodology and worries that it "may well lead intelligent and policy-wise analysts and commentators to draw the wrong conclusions about the importance of democratization." Gartzke responds in detail, noting that he relied on the same data as most democratic peace theorists. If it is true that democratic states don't go to war, then it also is true that "states with advanced free market economies never go to war with each other, either." The point is not that democracy is valueless. Free political systems naturally entail free elections and are more likely to protect other forms of liberty - civil and economic, for instance. However, democracy alone doesn't yield peace. To believe is does is dangerous: There's no panacea for creating a conflict-free world. That doesn't mean that nothing can be done. But promoting open international markets - that is, spreading **capitalism - is the best means to encourage peace as well as prosperity**. Notes Gartzke: "Warfare among developing nations will remain unaffected by the capitalist peace as long as the economies of many developing countries remain fettered by governmental control." Freeing those economies is critical. It's a particularly important lesson for the anti-capitalist left. For the most part, the enemies of economic liberty also most stridently denounce war, often in near-pacifist terms. Yet they oppose the very economic policies most likely to encourage peace. If market critics don't realize the obvious economic and philosophical value of markets - prosperity and freedom - they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest; globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war. Nothing is certain in life, and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that peace is good business. And **capitalism is good for peace**

Prioritize stopping **flashpoints of war** over **structural violence – stats prove** this is a better approach to stop **injustice**. Goldstein 1**[[33]](#footnote-31)**

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

Permutation do both: If the alternative can overcome the statu-quo, it can overcome the affirmative.

Alt fails – abstract movements won’t produce political results besides violence – embrace the hard work of pragmatic reform. **Condit 15[[34]](#footnote-32)**

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us **to “Act**” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, **we can call** his appeal both a failure of imagination and **a** failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and **the historical record indicates** quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the **production of** totalitarian states **and**/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All **symbolic movement has a trajectory**, and **if you have not** imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what **people will** leap into is **biological predispositions**—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard **work to invent better alternatives is not as** dramatically **enticing as the story of the kill**: such **labor is** piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But **if one does not provide a** viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, **then** Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

Policy focus is key – lack of policy focus destroys hope for change. **Light and Katz 96**[[35]](#footnote-33)

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precasrious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is **yes. Despite the problematic** (and, heretofore, ineffectual) **status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates** in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; **we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems**; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. **Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact.** In short, environmental **ethics must develop** for itself a methodology of environmental **pragmatism** – fueled by a recognition that **theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy**. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, **environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment**. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

## AT Fem K

Gender realism imagines the world in white terms. **Mikkola 6**[[36]](#footnote-34)

Uncle Theo holds a realist view of pebbles: he thinks that individual pebbles share the very same universal feature of pebblehood that makes individual pebbles (as opposed to, say, sand). **Feminist theorists** (on Spelman's view) **hold a parallel realist view of gender: individual women** share the very same universal feature of womanness that makes individual women (as opposed to, say, men). Women qua women, then, **have in common the very same feature of womanness found in all and only women.** Spelman went on to argue that no such universal exists and thus that gender realism (of any kind) must be false**.** Spelman maintained first that **the gender realist view,** which she took much of feminist theory to hold, **had resulted from white middle-class Western feminists falsely theorizing gender and gender oppression from the perspective of "white solipsism,**" the tendency to "think, imagine, and speak as if whiteness describes the world" (Adrienne Rich, quoted in Harris 1993, 356). As Spelman explained: If . . . I believe that the woman in every woman is a woman just like me, and if I also assume that there is no difference between [End Page 80] being white and being a woman, then seeing another woman 'as a woman' will involve seeing her as fundamentally like the woman I am. In other words, **the womanness underneath the Black woman's skin is a white woman's, and deep down inside the Latina woman is an Anglo woman waiting to burst through** an obscuring cultural shroud.(1990, 13) In Spelman's view, **white Western middle-class feminists have assumed that women all share some single feature and have theorized this feature as the one *they* possess. In doing so, they** inadvertently **created a notion of womanness where the common nature underneath the distorting cultural conditions is "white, middle-class, heterosexual, Christian, and able-bodied"** (Minow 1993, 339). Furthermore, this false notion of womanness, Spelman claimed, was "being passed off as a metaphysical truth" (1990, 186) thereby **privileging some women while marginalizing others.** White middle-class Western feminists simply did not understand the importance of race and class and by focusing on women merely as women (ignoring race and class differences) **they "conflate[d] the condition of one group of women with the condition of all"** (1990, 3).

What makes a woman a woman is different for all women. All parts of our identities make up who we are and can’t be separated out into things like a universal notion of woman. **Mikkola 6**[[37]](#footnote-35)

Spelman's discussion of white solipsism pointed to a further mistaken assumption that she believed feminist theorists held: what makes one woman a woman is the same as what makes another woman a woman. On the contrary, she claimed, "**gender is constructed and defined in conjunction with elements of identity such as race, class, ethnicity, and nationality**" (1990, 175). As a result, **what makes it true that two women are women is not that they share some common nature we can separate from other aspects of their identities**: What makes it true that Angela and I are women is not some 'woman' substance that is the same in each of us and interchangeable between us. **Selves are not made up of separable units of identity strung together to constitute a whole person.** It is not as if there is a goddess somewhere who made lots of little identical 'woman' units and then, in order to spruce up the world a bit for herself, decided to put some of those units in black bodies, some in white bodies, some in the bodies of kitchen maids in seventeenth century France, some in the bodies of English, Israeli, and Indian prime ministers. (1990, 158) Spelman argued that **those committed to gender realism had falsely assumed a woman's womanness is a neatly distinguishable part of her identity separable from all other aspects of the woman's identity** (such as her racial, cultural, and class identities). This was because, Spelman thought, the realist picture of gender falsely entails that all women qua women share the very same feature of womanness regardless of any other features they possess (such as those invoked [End Page 81] by racial and class identities). A woman's womanness (on this realist view) will remain unaffected by her race and class.

Alt fails – abstract movements won’t produce political results besides violence – embrace the hard work of pragmatic reform. **Condit 15[[38]](#footnote-36)**

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us **to “Act**” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, **we can call** his appeal both a failure of imagination and **a** failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and **the historical record indicates** quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the **production of** totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All **symbolic movement has a trajectory**, and **if you have not** imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what **people will** leap into is **biological predispositions**—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard **work to invent better alternatives is not as** dramatically **enticing as the story of the kill**: such **labor is** piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But **if one does not provide a** viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, **then** Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

Policy focus is key – lack of policy focus destroys hope for change. **Light and Katz 96**[[39]](#footnote-37)

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precasrious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is **yes. Despite the problematic** (and, heretofore, ineffectual) **status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates** in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; **we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems**; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. **Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact.** In short, environmental **ethics must develop** for itself a methodology of environmental **pragmatism** – fueled by a recognition that **theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy**. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, **environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment**. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

## AT Apoc Rhet

Perm Do both, either the Alt can solve the links to the AFF, or it isn’t strong enough to solve. Case and policymaking are the net benefits.

Disaster reps trigger empathy and communal engagement, which is totally OK because it also spurs the political, will for humanitarian assistance. Recuber ’11**[[40]](#footnote-38)**

Perhaps, then, what distant consumers express when they sit glued to the television watching a disaster replayed over and over, when they buy t-shirts or snow globes, when they mail teddy bears to a memorial, or when they tour a disaster site, is a deep, maybe subconscious, longing for those age-old forms of community and real human compassion that emerge in a place when disaster has struck. It is a longing in some ways so alien to the world we currently live in that it requires catastrophe to call it forth, even in our imaginations. Nevertheless, **the actions of unadulterated goodwill** that become commonplace in harrowing conditions **represent the** truly **authentic form of humanity that all of us,** to one degree or another, **chase** after in contemporary consumer culture every day. And while it is certainly a bit foolhardy to seek authentic humanity through disaster-related media and culture, the sheer strength of that desire has been evident in **the public’s response to** all the **disasters**, crises and catastrophes to hit the United States in the past decade. The millions of television viewers who cried on September 11, or during Hurricane Katrina and the Virginia Tech shootings, and the thousands upon thousands who volunteered their time, labor, money, and even their blood, as well as the countless others who created art, contributed to memorials, or adorned their cars or bodies with disaster-related paraphernalia— despite the fact that many knew no one who had been personally affected by any of these disasters—all **attest to a desire for** real human **community and compassion** that is woefully unfulfilled by American life under normal conditions today. In the end, **the consumption of disaster doesn’t make us** unable or **unwilling to engage with disasters on a communal level, or towards progressive political ends—it makes us feel as if we already have**, simply by consuming. It is ultimately less a form of political anesthesia than a simulation of politics, a Potemkin village of communal sentiment, that fills our longing for a more just and humane world with disparate acts of cathartic consumption. Still, the positive political potential **underlying such consumption**—the desire for real forms of connection and community—**remains the** most redeeming feature of disaster consumerism. Though that desire is frequently warped when various media lenses refract it, diffuse it, or reframe it to fit a political agenda, its overwhelming strength should nonetheless serve notice that people want a different world than the one in which we currently live, with a different way of understanding and responding to disasters. They want a world where risk is not leveraged for profit or political gain, but sensibly planned for with the needs of all socio-economic groups in mind. They want a world where preemptive strategies are used to anticipate the real threats posed by global climate change and global inequality, rather than to invent fears of ethnic others and justify unnecessary wars. They want a world where people can come together not simply as a market, but as a public, to exert real agency over the policies made in the name of their safety and security. And, **when disaster does strike, they want a world where the goodwill and compassion shown by their neighbors**, by strangers in their communities, and even by distant spectators and consumers, **will be matched by their own government**. Though this vision of the world is utopian, it is not unreasonable, and if contemporary American culture is ever to give us more than just an illusion 216 of safety, or empathy, or authenticity, then it is this vision that we must advocate on a daily basis, not only when disaster strikes.

Perm, Sever reps and still vote AFF because the consequences of the plan are good, it’s the net best strategy because it allows us to agree that their impacts are bad as long as they win that they are.

Policy focus is key – lack of policy focus destroys hope for change. **Light and Katz 96**[[41]](#footnote-39)

The problematic situation of environmental ethics greatly troubles us, both as philosophers and as citizens. We are deeply concerned about the precasrious state of the natural world, the environmental hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-term sustainable life on this planet. The environmental crisis that surrounds us is a fact of experience. It is thus imperative that environmental philosophy, as a discipline, address this crisis – its meaning, its causes and its possible resolution. Can philosophers contribute anything to an investigation of environmental problems? Do the traditions, history and skills of philosophical thought have any relevance to the development of environmental policy? We believe that the answer is **yes. Despite the problematic** (and, heretofore, ineffectual) **status of environmental ethics as a practical discipline, the field has much to offer. But the fruits of this philosophical enterprise must be directed towards the practical resolution of environmental problems – environmental ethics cannot remain mired in long-running theoretical debates** in an attempt to achieve philosophical certainty. As Mark Sagoff has written: [W]e have to get along with certainty; **we have to solve practical, not theoretical, problems**; and we must adjust the ends we pursue to the means available to accomplish them. **Otherwise, method becomes an obstacle to morality, dogma the foe of deliberation, and the ideal society we aspire to in theory will become a formidable enemy of the good society we can achieve in fact.** In short, environmental **ethics must develop** for itself a methodology of environmental **pragmatism** – fueled by a recognition that **theoretical debates are problematic for the development of environmental policy**. This collection is an attempt to bring together in one place the broad range of positions encompassed by calls for an environmental pragmatism. For us, **environmental pragmatism is the open-ended inquiry into the specific real-life problems of humanity’s relationship with the environment**. The new position ranges from arguments for an environmental philosophy informed by the legacy of classical American pragmatist philosophy, to the formulation of a new basis for the reassessment of our practice through a more general pragmatist methodology.

## AT Constitution NC

Util Comes before the constitution, the pre-amble dictates that we should “promote the general welfare” which outweighs because their arguments are that we should prefer the constitution because it sets a framework, but the preamble would then be the framework for the framework.

The nature of the US government is to minimize existential risks, which also turns the constitution. **Lincoln 64**[[42]](#footnote-40)

I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think, and feel. And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. It was in the oath I took that I would, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. I could not take the office without taking the oath. Nor was it my view that I might take an oath to get power, and break the oath in using the power. I understood, too, that in ordinary civil administration this oath even forbade me to practically indulge my primary abstract judgment on the moral question of slavery. I had publicly declared this many times, and in many ways. And I aver that, to this day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery. I did understand however, that **my oath to preserve the constitution** to the best of my ability, **imposed upon me the duty of preserving**, by every indispensabale means, that government — **that nation — of which that constitution was** the organic **law.** Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution? By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often **a limb must be amputated to save a life;** but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it. **I could not** feel that, to the best of my ability, I had even tried to **preserve the constitution, if**, to save slavery, or any minor matter, **I should permit the wreck of** government, **country, and Constitution all together.**

You should use modesty to evaluate the framework debate, which means that we would prioritize a terror scenario to the constitution. **Overing and Bistagne 14[[43]](#footnote-41)**

First, **ethical modesty seems consistent with** everyday **decision-making**. The following example is taken from the dissertation of Andrew Sepielli, now a professor at the University of Toronto: **Suppose** that **I am deciding whether to drink** a cup of **coffee. I have a degree of belief** of **.2** that **the coffee is mixed with** a deadly **poison, and** a degree of belief of **.8** that **it’s** perfectly **safe. If I act on** the hypothesis in which I have **the highest credence, I’ll drink** the coffee. **But this seems like a bad call**. A good chance of coffee isn’t worth such a significant risk of death – at least, not if I assign commonsensical values to coffee and death, respectively.[1] It’s hard to argue that confidence gets it right here. **We should think similarly** when deliberating **about normative theories**. Employing some social-contract theory, we might think that the United States government should take only Constitutional action; however, **some Constitutional violation might be permissible to protect** a large city **from a terrorist attack** even if **we care less about util**itarian reasons.

Fiat solves the link, the constitution allows for provisions to change it and the AFF fiats that those take place meaning that there is no violation.

## AT Property Rights NC

People are always influenced by external factors such as social and political environments, so there’s no measure for when someone is actually exercising their agency. At best, this means violations of agency are non-verifiable, and at worst, agency doesn’t exist because the social order configures the entirety of individual life. Further, there’s no brightline because we always limit agency to some extent and there’s no measure for when we’ve sufficiently protected agency to meet the standard.

Universalizability devolves to util and doesn’t justify always treating people as ends.

**Macintyre 81**[[44]](#footnote-42)

This formulation clearly does have a moral content, although one that is not very precise, if it is not supplemented by a good deal of further elucidation. What Kant means by treating someone as an end rather than as a means seems to be as follows – as I noticed earlier in using Kant’s moral philosophy to highlight a contrast with emotivism. I may propose a course of action to someone either by offering him reasons for so acting or by trying to influence him in non-rational ways. If I do the former I treat him as a rational will, worthy of the same respect as is due to myself, for in offering him reasons I offer him an impersonal consideration for him to evaluate. What makes a reason a good reason has nothing to do with who utters it on a given occasion; and until an agent has decided for himself whether a reason is a good reason or not, he has no reason to act. By contrast an attempt at non-rational suasion embodies an attempt to make the agent a mere instrument of my will, without any regard for his rationality. Thus what Kant enjoins is what a long line of moral philosophers have followed the Plato of the Gorgias in enjoining. But **Kant gives us no good reason for holding this position**. I can without any inconsistency whatsoever flout it; **‘Let everyone except me be treated as a means’ may be immoral, but it is not inconsistent and there is not** even any **inconsistency in willing a universe of egotists** all of **who**m **live by this maxim. It might be inconvenient** for each if everyone lived by this maxim**, but it would not be impossible and to invoke** considerations of **convenience would** in any case be to **introduce** just that **prudential reference to happiness** which Kant aspires to eliminate from all considerations of morality.

Absolutism fails. It can’t explain empirical uncertainty**. Jackson and Smith 6[[45]](#footnote-43)**

**A skier** is heading in a direction you know for sure **will trigger an avalanche that will kill ten people. You know the only way to save the ten people is** for you **to shoot him. The probability that the skier intends to** trigger the avalanche and **kill the ten people is 1-p**. We can agree that our target **absolutist theory says it is right** for you **to shoot if it is certain that the skier intends to kill the ten, that is, if** p = 0, for in that case you would not be killing someone innocent—you would be protecting the ten in the only way possible from an unprovoked attack. We can agree that our target theory says that it would be wrong for you to shoot if you are certain he simply happens to be skiing in that direction, that is, if p = 1, for then you would be intentionally killing someone innocent, and that is never right no matter how many you will be allowing to die by your failure to shoot. The number of lives that would be saved in the example as described is ten, but of course the distinctive position of absolutism is that the number does not matter: it is never right intentionally to kill the innocent no matter how many lives would be saved by doing so. Our question is, **What should the theory say for other values of p?** III. THE INFINITE DISVALUE APPROACH Perhaps **the simplest** absolutist **answer** to our question is to hold that whenever there is any chance that an action violates an absolute prohibition, the action ought not to be performed. This is the answer suggested by the absolutists' case against early stage abortion summarized above. In our example, the answer **would prohibit shooting the skier whenever there is any chance** that **he is innocent**, whenever, that is, p < 1. One way of implementing this answer is to assign infinite disvalue to intentionally killing the innocent and some finite disvalue to allowing people to die. For then the expected disvalue of the shooting—that is, the product of the disvalue of intentionally killing the innocent times the chance that the shooting is an intentional killing of the innocent—will exceed the disvalue of allowing others to die, no matter how many others die and how certain it is that they will die, provided there is some chance that the shooting is indeed an intentional killing of the innocent. It will, on this approach, be impossible to make the action that has some chance of being the intentional killing of someone innocent the right thing to do by making the number allowed to die by refraining from shooting large enough—the numbers allowed to die will be irrelevant, just as absolutists typically say.6 **The trouble** with this response **is that there is nearly always some** greater than zero **chance that someone is innocent. All the evidence may be against them, but** induction from **the past record of over turned verdicts** in cases that looked watertight at the time **tells us** that **there is nearly always some chance** that someone who looks clearly to be guilty is in fact innocent. We will get the result that it is never, or hardly ever, right to shoot the skier. Indeed, it will be hard to find any cases where it is right intentionally to kill someone as there is always some chance that the someone is innocent, and a small chance times an infinite disvalue equals an infinite dis value. **We will have a quick** (too quick) **argument from absolutism** against intentionally killing the innocent **to an extreme** kind of **personal pacifism**.

Also case turns the contention util is key to treating people as ends in them. **Cummiskey 90**[[46]](#footnote-44)

Indeed, despite Kant’s deontological intuitions about particular moral cases, his basic normative principle is best interpreted as having a fundamentally consequentialist structure. In order to justify agent-centered constraints, one needs a non-value-based rationale. Many Kantians attempt to provide such a rationale by appealing to the Kantian principle of treating persons as ends. The Kantians’ strategy is clear: Treating persons as ends involves respecting persons, and respecting persons involves recognizing agent-centered constraints on action. We have seen, however, that this strategy is problematic. The Kantian principle itself generates a duty to advance a moral goal: **The duty** to strive as much as one can **to promote** the **flourishing of rational beings, and** to **make others’ ends one’s own, is the** very **essence of treating humanity as an end.** Morality thus constrains and shapes the pursuit of individual well-being or happiness. We have seen, however, that **Kant**’s moral theory **does not provide a rationale for** basic **agent-centered constraints that limit** what we can do in the pursuit of **this** complex moral **goal.** The imperative to respect persons thus does indeed generate a consequentialist normative theory, rather than the desired deontological alternative. It certainly seems that a Kantian ought to be a normative consequentialist. Conscientious **Kantian agents have a** basic **duty** to strive, as much as possible, **to promote** the freedom and **happiness** of all rational beings. In the pursuit of this moral goal, **it may be necessary for** the **interests of some to give way for** the sake of **others.** If we are sacrificed, we are not treated simply as a means to another’s goal; on the contrary, our sacrifice is required by a principle we endorse. Our non-moral interests and inclinations may cause us to feel reluctant, but **since our sacrifice furthers a moral goal that we endorse and** that we **are required to pursue,** our **sacrifice does not violate our moral autonomy** or our right

## AT Minarchy NC

1. Interpretation the negative cannot read a case that generates offense based on consistency with the minarchy or minimalist state.
2. Violation…
3. Standards, Qualitative Ground, There’s functionally zero turn ground under the NC standard because offense derives from an increase in state jurisdiction. I can’t show the negative is inconsistent with a minimalist state – the state passing the handgun ban is a necessary consequence of any meaningful policy. Also proves even if there is turn ground, it’s bad since I cannot contest that legislation forces someone into doing something by the state and you say all state coercion is bad, and that aggregation is impossible. impacts: 1. It’s a necessary but insufficient - gives a 2-1 structural advantage because there are great turns to Util. 2. skews aff strategy- forces me to overinvest on a layer I can’t win on and lets him pick the NC or the offense to the AFF to go for in the 2NR based on which one I undercover. No loss of ground or strat under my interp – you get access to a Kantian standard, just not minarchy.
4. Voter, fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity and therefore requires the element of being fair in order to be legitimate, education is a voter

Evaluate theory with competing interpretations because otherwise theory becomes arbitrary and impossible to adjudicate.

Drop the debater

1. Key to deterrence brackets and ellipses prove drop the debater actually generates community norms, whereas drop the debater doesn’t because people don’t care if they just lose the argument.
2. The round is permanently skewed after abuse is introduced, so the only way to properly evaluate the round is by dropping the debater.

Absolutism fails. It can’t explain empirical uncertainty**. Jackson and Smith 6[[47]](#footnote-45)**

**A skier** is heading in a direction you know for sure **will trigger an avalanche that will kill ten people. You know the only way to save the ten people is** for you **to shoot him. The probability that the skier intends to** trigger the avalanche and **kill the ten people is 1-p**. We can agree that our target **absolutist theory says it is right** for you **to shoot if it is certain that the skier intends to kill the ten, that is, if** p = 0, for in that case you would not be killing someone innocent—you would be protecting the ten in the only way possible from an unprovoked attack. We can agree that our target theory says that it would be wrong for you to shoot if you are certain he simply happens to be skiing in that direction, that is, if p = 1, for then you would be intentionally killing someone innocent, and that is never right no matter how many you will be allowing to die by your failure to shoot. The number of lives that would be saved in the example as described is ten, but of course the distinctive position of absolutism is that the number does not matter: it is never right intentionally to kill the innocent no matter how many lives would be saved by doing so. Our question is, **What should the theory say for other values of p?** III. THE INFINITE DISVALUE APPROACH Perhaps **the simplest** absolutist **answer** to our question is to hold that whenever there is any chance that an action violates an absolute prohibition, the action ought not to be performed. This is the answer suggested by the absolutists' case against early stage abortion summarized above. In our example, the answer **would prohibit shooting the skier whenever there is any chance** that **he is innocent**, whenever, that is, p < 1. One way of implementing this answer is to assign infinite disvalue to intentionally killing the innocent and some finite disvalue to allowing people to die. For then the expected disvalue of the shooting—that is, the product of the disvalue of intentionally killing the innocent times the chance that the shooting is an intentional killing of the innocent—will exceed the disvalue of allowing others to die, no matter how many others die and how certain it is that they will die, provided there is some chance that the shooting is indeed an intentional killing of the innocent. It will, on this approach, be impossible to make the action that has some chance of being the intentional killing of someone innocent the right thing to do by making the number allowed to die by refraining from shooting large enough—the numbers allowed to die will be irrelevant, just as absolutists typically say.6 **The trouble** with this response **is that there is nearly always some** greater than zero **chance that someone is innocent. All the evidence may be against them, but** induction from **the past record of over turned verdicts** in cases that looked watertight at the time **tells us** that **there is nearly always some chance** that someone who looks clearly to be guilty is in fact innocent. We will get the result that it is never, or hardly ever, right to shoot the skier. Indeed, it will be hard to find any cases where it is right intentionally to kill someone as there is always some chance that the someone is innocent, and a small chance times an infinite disvalue equals an infinite dis value. **We will have a quick** (too quick) **argument from absolutism** against intentionally killing the innocent **to an extreme** kind of **personal pacifism**.

Also case turns the contention util is key to treating people as ends in them. **Cummiskey 90**[[48]](#footnote-46)

Indeed, despite Kant’s deontological intuitions about particular moral cases, his basic normative principle is best interpreted as having a fundamentally consequentialist structure. In order to justify agent-centered constraints, one needs a non-value-based rationale. Many Kantians attempt to provide such a rationale by appealing to the Kantian principle of treating persons as ends. The Kantians’ strategy is clear: Treating persons as ends involves respecting persons, and respecting persons involves recognizing agent-centered constraints on action. We have seen, however, that this strategy is problematic. The Kantian principle itself generates a duty to advance a moral goal: **The duty** to strive as much as one can **to promote** the **flourishing of rational beings, and** to **make others’ ends one’s own, is the** very **essence of treating humanity as an end.** Morality thus constrains and shapes the pursuit of individual well-being or happiness. We have seen, however, that **Kant**’s moral theory **does not provide a rationale for** basic **agent-centered constraints that limit** what we can do in the pursuit of **this** complex moral **goal.** The imperative to respect persons thus does indeed generate a consequentialist normative theory, rather than the desired deontological alternative. It certainly seems that a Kantian ought to be a normative consequentialist. Conscientious **Kantian agents have a** basic **duty** to strive, as much as possible, **to promote** the freedom and **happiness** of all rational beings. In the pursuit of this moral goal, **it may be necessary for** the **interests of some to give way for** the sake of **others.** If we are sacrificed, we are not treated simply as a means to another’s goal; on the contrary, our sacrifice is required by a principle we endorse. Our non-moral interests and inclinations may cause us to feel reluctant, but **since our sacrifice furthers a moral goal that we endorse and** that we **are required to pursue,** our **sacrifice does not violate our moral autonomy** or our right

## AT Self defense NC

1. Interpretation, the negative must read a necessary and sufficient standard, different from that of the affirmative
2. Violation, Obviously there are ethical concerns other then the right to self defense which the NC doesn’t.
3. Standards, Philosophical education, there’s no way we can get any philosophical education, if the standard is insufficient, then there is no way that it could be practically useful, as it can’t govern all action and subscribes to the underpinnings of greater theories that are conceded to be correct. And philosophical education is an independent voter because it is the only element of education, that is intrinsic to LD, we rarely if ever get it to the same degree elsewhere, and by the very nature that we picked this as an activity we agree that it’s important.
4. Voter fairness is a voter because debate is a competitive activity and therefore requires the element of being fair in order to be legitimate. Education is a voter because it is the portable purpose of debate.

Evaluate theory with competing interps because otherwise theory becomes arbitrary and impossible to adjudicate.

Drop the debater

1. Key to deterrence brackets and ellipses prove drop the debater actually generates community norms, whereas drop the debater doesn’t because people don’t care if they just lose the argument.
2. The round is permanently skewed after abuse is introduced, so the only way to properly evaluate the round is by dropping the debater.

Overview to the framework: Rights don’t exist.  Utilitarianism doesn’t deduce rights because all “rights” are violable any time it produces a net benefit, so the right would never constrain.  Deontology doesn’t either because the categorical imperative tests maxims of action for internal consistency, or the results of that procedure are not rights attached to any particular person, but rules by which all must abide.

Also extinction turns the framework

1. Right to self-defense is predicated upon a right to life, which means that extinction is relevant.
2. Their argument is that guns prevent the ability to exercise the right obviously extinction would too.

The contention doesn’t speak to handgun bans obviously people could still acquire assault weapons which is sufficient for them to use in order to defend themselves, which means they can’t possibly win a link to the NC.

Turn, the right to life is a contradiction because whomever you’re defending yourself against also has a right to life that the gun would violate by killing them.

## AT Bostrom Bad

A. Counter-interp: aff can read a moral framework and say extinction comes first, because of moral uncertainty.

B. I meet

C Reasons to prefer

* 1. Reciprocity. NEG can make preclusive arguments, and we can compare warrants.
  2. Phil education. A huge part of the lit is about both moral uncertainty and existential risks. Even deontologists debate about thresholds.
  3. 1AR time skew. If I can’t make framework weighing, the NC can always spread me out with a 10-point util dump. Empirical NEG bias proves 1AR time skew is the largest link to fairness.
  4. Not a fairness question. My job is to make strong arguments.
  5. Theory proliferation. Their interp justifies people running theory anytime they hit a framework card they don’t like. This massively crowds out substantive education.
  6. Extinction education. Any risk I increase discussion of extinction outweighs your offense – that’s Bostrom.
  7. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom where every round becomes theory. Use reasonability – intervention’s inevitable in blippy theory debates.

**AT Resolvability**

1. No link. We can compare warrants between Bostrom and other solutions to moral uncertainty.

2. TURN—Parli model’s key to resolvability. It says compromise resolves disagreement between competing ethical views.

3. No link to fairness. If the round is irresolvable, we’re both screwed.

4. Empirically denied. No judge has ever refused to resolve a round because of Bostrom.

5. Time skew turns resolvability. You can’t tell who did the better debating if the neg only wins because of longer speech times.

6. Neg has the option to concede extinction first.

**AT Reciprocity**

1. Bostrom’s not a NIB. You can turn it.

2. Aff NIBs are good. I have to collapse to avoid time skew. I literally can’t go for everything in a 3 minute 2AR.

3. Turn – neg can make moral uncertainty claims also.

4. Turn – Bostrom’s key to reciprocity. Compensates for neg framework preclusion like skep triggers and permissibility.

5. Reciprocity bad. I need more ground to solve time skew.

6. Conceding Bostrom solves.

**AT Clash**

1. TURN – Bostrom’s key to clash. It forces you to engage me in a topical debate instead of just reading util answers and ignoring the contention.

2. TURN – Bostrom’s key to clash. You have to directly answer it unlike simply dumping general answers to a framework without answering the particular warrants.

3. Theory proliferation turns clash. Debaters go for theory all the time to hide from clash.

4. Education outweighs. Clash isn’t meaningful unless it teaches us something.

5. No link to education – the education happened before the round whether we clash or not.

6. Lack of clash is inevitable – most rounds get decided on dropped arguments, not substantive clash.

7. TURN – Bostrom’s key to clash. It ensures AC offense directly interacts with the NC. Bostrom is functionally “extinction turns the NC”, that’s the weighing ground standard.

## AT No Link Chain Advocate Bad

A. Counter-interp: The aff doesn’t need to read a single author that defends each component of their extinction scenario.

B. I meet

C. Reasons to prefer

1. The logic of their abuse story equally applies to NCs where the framework authors don’t agree with the contention. If that’s ridiculous, so is requiring a single author for the entire extinction scenario.

2. Strat skew. Most authors assume their impacts are good, so I’d need a separate author to quantify them. Their interp even prevents me from accessing plausible systemic scenarios—I needed two authors to say “the aff reduces work hours, and that improves quality of life.”

3. Topic education. Extinction scenarios are key to in-depth understanding of the topic. My aff proves—my internal link card came from a NASA-funded study about income inequality causing famine.

4. Reject the argument solves. If they win theory, evaluate the rest of the debate on whether the aff helps the poor. “Systemic impacts first” weighing belongs on substance.

5. Extinction education. They make extinction scenarios impossible because solvency authors assume their impacts—that’s above.

Existential risks are discounted by arbitrary cognitive biases. **Marcus 13**[[49]](#footnote-47)

There are known knowns and known unknowns, but what we should be worried about most is the unknown unknowns. Not because they are the most serious risks we face, but because psychology tells us that **unclear risks** that are **in the distant future are** the **risks we are less likely to take seriously** enough. At least four distinct psychological mechanisms are at work. First, we are moved more by vivid information, than by abstract information (even when the abstract information should in principle dominate). Second, we discount the future, rushing for the dollar now as opposed to the two dollars we could have a year later if we waited. Third, **the focusing illusion** (itself perhaps driven by the more general phenomenon of priming) **tends to make us dwell on** our most **immediate problems**, even if more serious problems loom in the background. Fourth, we have a tendency to believe in a just world, in which nature naturally rights itself. These four mechanisms likely derive from different sources, some stemming from systems that govern motivation (future discounting), others from systems that mediate pleasure (belief in a just world), others from **the structure of our memory** (the focusing illusion, and the bias from vividness). Whatever their source, the four together **create a** potent **psychological drive** for us **to underweight distant future risks that we cannot fully envision.** Climate change is a case in point. In 1975, the Columbia University geochemist Wallace S. **Broecker wrote** an important and prescient article called **"**Climatic Change: **Are We on the Brink of** a **Pronounced** Global **Warming?",** **but his worries were ignored for decades,** in part **because many** people **presumed, fallaciously, that nature would** somehow **automatically set itself right.** (And, in keeping with people's tendency to draw their inference primarily from vivid information, a well-crafted feature film on climate change played a significant role in gathering public attention, arguably far more so than the original article in *Science*.) Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom has pointed out that the three greatest unknowns we should be worry about are biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the rise of machines that are more intelligent than human beings. Each sounds like science fiction, and has in fact been portrayed in science fiction, but each poses genuine threats. Bostrom's posits "existential risks": possible, if unlikely, calamities, that would wipe out our entire species, much as asteroids appear to have extinguished dinosaurs. Importantly, many of these risks, in his judgment, exceed the existential risk of other concerns that occupy a considerably greater share of public attention. Climate change, may be more likely, and certainly is more vivid, but is less likely to lead to the complete extinction of the human species (even though it could conceivably kill a significant fraction of us). The truth is that we simply don't know enough about the potential biotechnology, nanotechonology, or future iterations of artificial intelligence to calculate what their risks are, compelling arguments have been made that in principle any of the three could lead to human extinction. These risks may prove manageable, but I don't think we can manage them if we don't take them seriously. In the long run, biotech, nanotech and AI are probably significantly more likely to help the species, by increasing productivity and limiting disease, than they are to destroy it. But we need to invest more in figuring out exactly what the risks are, and to better prepare for then. Right now, the US spends more than $2.5 billion dollars a year studying climate change, but (by my informal reckoning) less than 1% of that total studying the risk of biotech, nanotech, and AI. What **we** really **should be worried** about is **that we are not** quite **doing enough to prepare for the unknown.**

Extinction education also outweighs fairness and other forms of education because we can’t have those if we’re dead.

**AT Experts=brains shut down**

1. This evidence is about people taking expert opinion as advice for their own lives, not debates where people have to defend the strength of their evidence. My brain can’t possibly shut down if they force me to think of 1AR responses.

2. Non-unique. Debaters’ brains could shut down when they get inundated with lots of philosophy cards and bad theory spikes.

**AT Tetlock**

Experts are right about their subject areas. Tetlock assumes subjects that experts are unfamiliar with. **Caplan 5**[[50]](#footnote-48)

Is my confidence in experts completely misplaced? I think not. **Tetlock**'s sample **suffers from** severe **selection bias**. **He deliberately asked** relatively **difficult and controversial questions**. As his methodological appendix explains, **questions had to "Pass the 'don't bother me** too often **with dumb questions' test." Dumb according to who?** The implicit answer is "Dumb according to **the typical expert** in the field." **What Tetlock really shows** is **that experts are overconfident if you exclude the questions where they have reached** a **solid consensus.** This is still an important finding. Experts really do make overconfident predictions about controversial questions. We have to stop doing that! However, this does not show that experts are overconfident about their core findings. It's particularly important to make this distinction because **Tetlock's work is so good that a lot of crackpots will want to highjack it:** "Experts are scarcely better than chimps, so why not give intelligent design and protectionism equal time?" But what **Tetlock** really **shows** is **that experts can raise** their **credibility if they stop overreaching**.

**AT Quantify impacts analytically**

Specifying impacts analytically is ridiculous because I’m not an expert. Assuming those impacts are good without quantifying them prevents in-depth weighing debates which are key to education.

Rejecting expert predictions in favor of personal assessment kills sound a analysis **Fitzsimmons 7**[[51]](#footnote-49)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng-  ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors  can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision-  makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive  limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and  complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of  risk, variability in strategiccalculation should be carefully tailored to available  analytic and decision processes.  Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity  and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, **where analysis is**silent or **inadequate**, the **personal beliefs**of decision-makers  **fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur-  prise, in ‘an environment **that lacks clarity**, abounds with conflicting data, **and  allows no time for**rigorous **assessment** of sources and validity, ambiguity allows  intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... **The greater the ambiguity, the  greater the impact of preconceptions**.’16The decision-making environment that  Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ-  ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making.  He **invites ambiguity**, takes conflicting data for granted **and substitutes a priori  scepticism about the validity of prediction** for time pressure as a rationale for  discounting the importance of analytic rigour.  It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous  assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and  scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of  decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate  those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be  both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite  extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what  is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? **A decision-maker with no** faith in **prediction is left with** little more than a set of  worst-case scenarios and his **existing beliefs**about the world to confront the  choices before him.Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but **if they  are not**made explicit and **subject to**analysis and **debate** regarding their application to particular strategic contexts**, they remain only beliefs**and premises**, rather than rational judgements**. Even at their best, such **decisions are**likely to  be **poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation.** At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers  themselves.

## AT Spec [All varieties]

A. Counter-Interpritation: The AFF does not have to specify X

B. I meet  
C. Reasons to prefer…

1. **It’s infinitely regressive**. I could always spec more, which causes theory prolif. NEG can always nitpick further details. If I spec the agent they’ll just read SigSpec. Multiple implications.

(a) **Proves they set an arbitrary bright line**, which is a double-turn with the reasonability bad claims.

(b) **Causes theory prolif**. NEG can always nitpick further details. The **substance crowd-out** impact is conceded from the AC. The zero educational value **outweighs on magnitude** even if fairness comes first general.

(c) **Impact magnifier**; if your reading spec you were going to read theory no matter what, which is terminal defense on their standards.

(d) **The topic’s the only universally agreed upon standard**, which means it’s the **least arbitrary** bright line for spec.

2. **No resolutional basis**. I defend **exactly** what the topic asks. That’s most predictable. Also solves your plans good offense with a diversity net benefit. **Nebel 15**[[52]](#footnote-50)

Second, my view is not that plans are bad. On the contrary, **I think that plans are good, but only when they affirm** the resolution. Whether some plan affirms their resolution (i.e., whether it is topical) is a function of the resolution’s semantics. To repeat, I have nothing against plans in general, and I believe that **spec**ification of some resolutional parameter **may be** permissible, if not **obligatory, on many topics.** One of the great things about **LD** is that our **resolutions are diverse** not only in their subject matter but also in their structure. **This requires debaters to analyze each resolution with a fresh eye and not simply** to **import concepts** and assumptions that may have applied to old resolutions into theoretical norms for each new one. But when the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. It is easier to continue with the same assumptions, as long as they are sufficiently shared by one’s peers on the national circuit, rather than reinventing the theoretical wheel every two months. It is important to resist this temptation and not to ignore the meaning of the resolution, even and especially if you may be more comfortable debating a different resolution.

3. **More specific NEG ground is bad**. They already have links to every stock NEG arg. Spec allows PICs or hyper-specific DAs that steal the AFF and force 1AR restart.

4. **Normal means solves**. You could resolve ambiguity by cutting a definition card because I’m bound to defending whatever the topic means.

5. **No abuse**. The same issues of usually apply regardless me specing or not, also at worst this is potential abuse, because I only might’ve de linked stuff, and don’t vote on potential abuse, because then you could vote on fifty “potential” turns I could’ve read.

6. **Topic lit**. Most authors say the same thing—specific examples are used to justify a general conclusion, not something spesific.

7. **CX checks**. They didn’t ask me to spec in CX, so reject his interp. That’s net beneficial—(a) Predictability. they’ll only ask me to defend the advocacy that they want. (b) Topic education. CX checks avoids frivolous theory debate.

**AT: Shifting**

1. No link. I’m not shifty.

2. Ex post facto theory solves.

3. TURN – the resolution itself is the single most stable plan because it’s the only one that’s universally accepted as topical.

4. Spec doesn’t solve. I could be shifty about the function of a plan, too.

5. Definitions check. You could define words in the rez to hold me to one interp.

**AT: Neg Ground**

1. Uniqueness goes aff. Neg has a massive ground skew already. There’s tons of counterplans and great solvency lit.

2. TURN – spec explodes neg ground. They gets tiny process counterplans and hyper-specific DAs.

3. Empirics go aff. Most debates that are policy oriendted are generic counterplans, not States and politics.

4. Side bias impact turns this. Any ground skew moves us closer to equity.

## AT 50 Nifty Bad

1. Counter interpretation debaters may run a counterplan that chooses the fifty states as the actor instead of the United States Federal Government
2. I meet
3. Standards,

**Predictability**

* 1. There are infinite AFFs, I need some flex in order to answer back the infinite possible AFFs, I can’t cut infinite case NEGs or write infinite counterplans
  2. This was in the literature, and a bunch of debaters have this exact counterplan on their wiki page so you definitely could’ve predicted it.

**Reciprocity,**

You got to spec the actor it would be reciprocal if I can pick one too , you just picked a bad actor that’s your fault not mine.

**Real World education**

1. Learning about different policies make us informed advocates for solutions-it’s illogical to assume congressional action is the best, also my education outweighs beucase it’s far more likely that we are elected to a state congress then the federal one.
2. Critical thinking-forces teams to understand the intricacies of government processes and how it interacts with the net benefit
3. Best policy option-debate is a referendum on policies and if we win the CP you should reward us for choosing the best

d. Crucial to force genuine “Federal key” warrants --- States counterplans alone allow the Aff to manipulate current jurisdiction to avoid this --- and, that’s important for education Columbia Encyclopedia 1**[[53]](#footnote-51)**

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT [federal government] or federation, government of a union of states in which sovereignty is divided between a central authority and component state authorities. A federation differs from a confederation in that the central power acts directly upon individuals as well as upon states, thus creating the problem of dual allegiance. Substantial power over matters affecting the people as a whole, such as external affairs, commerce, coinage, and the maintenance of military forces, are usually granted to the central government. Nevertheless, retention of jurisdiction over local affairs by states is compatible with the federal system and makes allowance for local feelings. The chief political problem of a federal system of government is likely to be the allocation of sovereignty, because the need for unity among the federating states may conflict with their desire for autonomy.

**Ground**

1. Federal is a central portion of the topic – I should be able to counterplan against
2. Plan debates mean that I get everything outside the plan as ground, as long as its competitive, I lose ground if I don’t.
3. It increases your ground you can always impact turn federalism.

## AT Type of Util Spec

A. Counter-interp: The AFF can read a standard of “maximizing happiness” without explicitly specifying a type of util if they read extinction scenarios.

B. I meet

C. Reasons to prefer

1. Solves the abuse.

(a) Proves the AFF is implicitly act-util because it justifies the plan based on individual scenarios rather than a general rule. They should know that and strategize accordingly.

(b) They should know how to straight-up answer an extinction scenario even if the standard was vague.

(c) If I don’t spec the type of util, they can check in CX.

2. Reciprocity. Their interp doesn’t require people to clarify the nuances of other frameworks, so they’ve placed an unequal burden on util debaters.

3. Extinction education. Debating about act vs. rule-util trades off with debating about existential risks. Outweighs fairness because we can’t have fairness if we’re all dead.

4. Strat skew. Their interp encourages debaters to read extremely narrow standards based on a particular type of util. Broader standards are better—

(a) Narrow standards allow arbitrary exclusions of offense and,

(b) Broader standards allow for a nuanced debate about what counts as offense under that standard.

## AT TJF Bad

I meet, I just say policymaking is good but you can argue that policymakers should be deontologists that’s just Ripstein which means it doesn’t directly justify util.

A. Counter interp, debaters may read justifications for their framework that impact back to education or fairness.

Reasons to prefer

1. Fairness or education commonly come before the truth of arguments, i.e topicality is justified by the education or fairness of the interpretation and not just the “truth”. This applies because framework is essentially just topicality on what morality is.

2. If Theory can’t be used to justify a framework then logically speaking it couldn’t be used to check back against one either, which leads to infinite abuse on the framework level, which also means that I’ll always outweigh, and turn their offence.

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